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FOR WHOM BELL TOLLS: A DECEDENT'S RIGHT
TO § 1983 PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES IN
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'
Michael D. Moberly*
I. INTRODUCTION
An important federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, states in pertinent part as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ... '
This statute is invoked so frequently that it is often sim-
ply referred to as "Section 1983. "2 Section 1983 is one of sev-
t With deference to Ernest Hemingway, the title reference is to Bell v.
City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984), which has been characterized
as the "leading § 1983 wrongful death case" by one Ninth Circuit court analyz-
ing the issue discussed in this article. Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp.
1248, 1254 (E.D. Wash. 1987); see also Steven H. Steinglass, Wrongful Death
Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L.J. 559, 631 n.424 (1984) ("Bell has become
the starting point in the analysis of Section 1983 wrongful death actions.").
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Apple-
white, Phoenix, Arizona; Chairman, Arizona Agricultural Employment Rela-
tions Board; Editor, The Arizona Labor Letter. The author represented the de-
fendants in Burns v. City of Scottsdale, No. CIV 96-0578-PHX-RGS, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13961, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 1998), one of the cases discussed in
this article, and is grateful to the plaintiffs attorney in that case, Craig
Stephan, for reviewing and commenting on an earlier draft.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
2. Ironically, § 1983 was invoked relatively infrequently during its first
century of existence. See Skevofilax v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 535 (D.N.J.
1984); Thurman v. Rose, 575 F. Supp. 1488, 1491 (N.D. Ind. 1983). Since its
409
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eral Reconstruction-era statutes3 enacted in response to the
corrupting influence of the Ku Klux Klan and its sympathiz-
ers on the governments and law enforcement agencies of the
southern states.4 Although the statute's coverage clearly ex-
tends to other protected classes as well,5 § 1983 was primarily
intended to deter "officially-condoned lawless conduct di-
rected against newly-freed blacks"6 by creating what is essen-
tially a tort remedy in favor of persons deprived of their fed-
eral civil rights.7 As one court observed, "Broadly described,
the intent of § 1983 was to create a civil remedy for persons
who prove that one acting under color of state law has ille-
gally deprived them of rights guaranteed by the federal con-
stitution or by federal law."'
As in the case of conventional state law torts,9 the recov-
resurrection in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. De-
partment of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), however, the statute has been
"revitalized" to the point where it is now unquestionably "the main [statutory]
vehicle for constitutional tort litigation." Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d
1211, 1226 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring).
3. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590 (1978); Bell, 746 F.2d at
1232. The Supreme Court observed that the political climate of the Reconstruc-
tion period was not conducive to the enactment of well-crafted legislation, not-
ing that "[s]trong post-war feeling caused inadequate deliberation and led to
loose and careless phrasing of laws." United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 74
(1951).
4. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 (1980).
5. See, e.g., A-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1991) (not-
ing that § 1983 protects members of "minority or non-traditional religions");
Cota v. Tucson Police Dep't, 783 F. Supp. 458, 470 (D. Ariz. 1992) (holding that
Hispanics are a class protected by § 1983); Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp.
212, 216 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (concluding that "Indian plaintiffs are protected by
Section 1983"). See generally Graham v. Sauk Prairie Police Comm'n, 915 F.2d
1085, 1105 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that while § 1983 "may in some cases be
aimed at deterring a specific motivation (for instance, racial animus)," its reach
is much broader); Butts v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir.
1971) ("The absence of a racial question has been ignored in many cases under
§ 1983 .... ).
6. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1232 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174-75). But cf. Berry
v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1501 n.17 (10th Cir. 1990) (observing that
the remedy afforded by § 1983 "was not limited to former slaves").
7. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978); Strickland v. Deaconess
Hosp., 735 P.2d 74, 76 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). But cf. Sager v. City of Woodland
Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 293 (D. Colo. 1982) (observing that "the civil rights acts
were not intended to serve as a general tort remedy") (citing Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981)).
8. Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455, 460 (Colo. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456
U.S. 430 (1982).
9. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 507 F. Supp. 21,
24-25 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("[D]amages recoverable in a products liability action in-
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ery available under § 198310 typically includes damages for
pain and suffering.1' The basic purposes of an award of such
damages is twofold. First, § 1983 compensates plaintiffs for
injuries caused by deprivations of their federal constitutional
or statutory rights. 12 Second, such an award often serves an
important deterrent function as well.
13
In the Ninth Circuit, § 1983 does not provide a cause of
action for civil rights violations that an individual suffers af-
ter his death,14 because a decedent is not considered a "per-
son" within the protection of § 1983.1' On the other hand, a §
clude conscious pain and suffering resulting from bodily injury .... ); Myers v.
Rollette, 439 P.2d 497, 502 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968) ("It is well established that
pain and suffering are proper elements to consider in awarding damages in a
negligence action for personal injuries.").
10. Section 1983 "does not expressly specify what damages are recoverable
for its violation," Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 582 (Ct. App.
1996), and there is likewise "little in the section's legislative history concerning
the damages recoverable," Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983). See also
Carey, 435 U.S. at 255 ("The [m]embers of the Congress that enacted § 1983 did
not address directly the question of damages ....").
11. See Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 581 (2d Cir.
1989); Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1270 (5th Cir. 1986). One court in the
Ninth Circuit characterized damages for pain and suffering as "the most signifi-
cant measure of § 1983 damages." Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp.
1074, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
12. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 254; Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489,
1506-07 (10th Cir. 1990); Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 518-20 (7th Cir.
1981); Frye v. Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
13. See, e.g., Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (S.D. Ala. 1986). See
generally Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986)
("Deterrence ... operates through the mechanism of damages that are compen-
satory-damages grounded in determinations of plaintiffs' actual losses.") (em-
phasis in original).
14. Guyton v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 916 (1980); cf. Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979):
[Elvents occurring post obitum could form no part of the deceased's 42
U.S.C. § 1983 ... action. The essence of a claim under [that] section is
the deprivation of a person's constitutional rights .... After death, one
is no longer a person within our constitutional and statutory frame-
work, and has no rights of which he may be deprived.
Id. But cf. Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 371 (9th
Cir. 1998) (assuming, without deciding, that "the estate of a person who is the
subject of perjury after death can state . . . a [§ 1983] claim").
15. See Guyton, 606 F.2d at 250; Whitehurst, 592 F.2d at 840; Love v. Bolin-
ger, 927 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (S.D. Ind. 1996). The state survival statutes dis-
cussed infra are not likely to alter this result, even though they may apply to
permit the survival of § 1983 claims generally. See, e.g., Dohaish v. Tooley, 670
F.2d 934, 937 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that a state survival statute authorized
survival of "actions that... 'accrued' prior to death," but did not apply where
"no action accrued during the lifetime of the decedent"). But cf. Gonsalves v.
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1983 claim premised upon civil rights violations that occur
prior to death clearly can survive the subsequent death of the
victim,16 at least where survival is authorized under an appli-
cable state law.'7 An unresolved issue is whether, and to
what extent, the survivors in such a case can recover dam-
ages for pain and suffering experienced by the decedent prior
to death. 8
At common law, a cause of action for personal injuries-
of which § 1983 claims are generally considered to be an ex-
ample' 9-abated upon the death of the injured party. ° The
common law rule has been the subject of enormous criticism,2'
City of New Bedford, 939 F. Supp. 921, 928 (D. Mass. 1996) ("[A]lthough nei-
ther ... a decedent nor [his] estate ... is a person with rights for which § 1983
provides a remedy, a cover-up can violate the rights of [the decedent's] survivors
who may maintain their claims through his estate.") (parentheses omitted).
16. See In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1994) ("A § 1983
action... survives the death of a party."). But cf. James v. Murphy, 392 F.
Supp. 641, 645 (M.D. Ala. 1975) ("[A] good argument could be made for § 1983
not providing for survival since the language of the statute provides remedies
only for 'the party injured."'); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87, 95 n.8
(Idaho 1990) (holding that "a § 1983 action... did not survive [the victim's]
death").
17. See Byrd v. Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) ("It is undisputed
that survival actions are permitted under § 1983 if authorized by the applicable
state law.").
18. One federal appellate court observed that "there is no federal policy
against awarding damages for pain and suffering" under these circumstances.
Greene v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 166 n.9 (4th Cir. 1972); cf. In re Ko-
rean Air Lines Disaster, 807 F. Supp. 1073, 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (perceiving
"no federal statutory or common law bar to [a] survival action brought by [a] de-
cedent's estate . . .to recover damages for [the] decedent's conscious pain and
suffering"). However, it may be "appropriate to look to state law... to supply
an appropriate remedy for § 1983 violations" when the victim has died. Berry v.
City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1505 (10th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); see
also Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1236 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Where the
constitutional deprivation sought to be remedied in a Section 1983 action causes
death and the applicable state law ...would allow recovery for the damage
claim at issue, courts generally apply the state law.").
19. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985) (holding that "§ 1983
claims are best characterized as personal injury actions"); Bell, 746 F.2d at 1242
n.43 ("Many courts have adopted the position that for survivorship ... purposes,
§ 1983 actions can be viewed as redressing personal injuries."); Almond v. Kent,
459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972) ("In the broad sense, every cause of action un-
der § 1983 which is well-founded results from 'personal injuries.'").
20. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 n.14 (1973); McLellan
v. Automobile Ins. Co., 80 F.2d 344, 348 (9th Cir. 1935); Evans, 796 P.2d at 92;
Harrington v. Flanders, 407 P.2d 946, 947 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965).
21. See, e.g., Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 338 P.2d 702, 711 (Colo.
1959) (referring to the rule's "lack of logic and soundness as a matter of social
policy") (parentheses omitted); Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co., 313
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and virtually all states have enacted statutes,22 commonly
known as "survival statutes,"" allowing tort actions to con-
tinue upon the death of the plaintiff.2 4 Because § 1983 itself is
silent on this question,2 and there is no general federal sur-
vival statute,26 these state statutes also provide the principal
N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ill. Ct. App. 1974) (describing the rule as "harsh and unjust");
Canino v. New York News, 475 A.2d 528, 529 (N.J. 1984) (asserting that the
rule has "no foundation in principle"); Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 442 (Pa.
1975) (noting characterization of the rule as "one of the least rational parts of
our law") (authority and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gustafson
v. Rajkovich, 263 P.2d 540, 548 (Ariz. 1953) (Phelps, J., dissenting) (character-
izing the rule as "an ancient and barbaric legal concept long since outworn").
See generally Mickelson v. Williams, 340 P.2d 770, 772 (Wash. 1959) ("The
common-law rule as to the survival of tort actions has been the subject of most
severe criticism.").
22. See In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, 778 F. Supp. 625,
631 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The overwhelming majority of states have survival stat-
utes. .. ."), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, 975
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1165 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (observing that "most states have survival statutes"), disapproved on
other grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984). But
cf. Evans, 796 P.2d at 92 ("[T]he Idaho legislature has not enacted any statute
specifically abrogating the common law rule of non-survival of causes of action
ex delicto in cases where the victim dies before recovery."); Thompson v. Estate
of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 403 n.6 (Minn. 1982) (observing that while "[a]lmost
all statutes permit causes of action for injuries to property to survive," only
"[a]pproximately one-half of the states permit the survival of certain personal
injury actions").
23. In this context, a survival statute is "a statute wherein the decedent's
right to recover for a tort survives, and can be enforced by his executors, ad-
ministrators, or heirs." Rice v. Vancouver S.S. Co., 60 F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir.
1932); see also Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 575 n.2 (1974) ("Sur-
vival statutes permit the deceased's estate to prosecute any claims for personal
injury the deceased would have had, but for his death.") (emphasis omitted).
24. See Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449, 1451 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Stat-
utes allowing the survival of actions were intended to modify the traditional
rule that an injured party's claim was extinguished upon the death of either
party."); Thompson, 319 N.W.2d at 406 ("The purpose of [a survival] statute [is]
to alleviate in part the harsh results of the common law rule prohibiting the
survival of any cause of action.").
25. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1985) ("[S]ection 1983
itself is silent on the question whether an action pursuant to its provisions sur-
vives the death of the victim of the alleged violations."); County of Los Angeles
v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 360 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The federal Civil
Rights Act does not.., address the survival of claims and remedies upon the
death of the victim."), rev'd, 981 P.2d 1268 (Cal. 1999); Garcia v. Superior Court,
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 582 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The federal Civil Rights Act does not
expressly specify.., whether a cause of action survives the victim's death.").
26. See Miller v. Apartments & Homes of N.J., 646 F.2d 101, 108 (3d Cir.
1981) (noting "the absence of general federal provisions concerning survival of
actions"); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir. 1961) (stating that "no
federal statute specifically deals with the substantive issue of survival"); City of
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reference point in assessing the survival of § 1983 actions.27
Generally, the state survival statutes apply to preserve
§ 1983 actions where the victim is deceased.28
However, many state survival statutes, including several
in the Ninth Circuit, preclude any recovery for the decedent's
pain and suffering.29 These survival statutes typically rely on
the theory that, once deceased, an injured party cannot bene-
fit from an award of such damages." Litigants frequently
Tarrant v. Jefferson, 682 So. 2d 29, 30 (Ala. 1996) (stating that "no federal stat-
ute provides for the survivability of § 1983 claims"), cert. dismissed as improvi-
dently granted, 522 U.S. 75 (1997); Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So. 2d 207, 209 (La.
Ct. App.) (noting that "federal statutory law does not address the survival of §
1983 claims"), review denied, 472 So. 2d 919 (La. 1985); Strickland v. Deaconess
Hosp., 735 P.2d 74, 77 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (observing that "no federal sur-
vival provision exist[s]").
27. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1978); Ochoa, 703
P.2d at 11; Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1165. As one federal court noted, "[t]he
statutory mechanism that authorizes resort to state survival law to permit civil
rights actions to survive the plaintiflt']s death is 42 U.S.C. § 1988." Sager v.
City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 288 (D. Colo. 1982). That statute,
which is occasionally referred to in the case law (and this article) as "§ 1988,"
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[I]n all cases where [the laws of the United States] ... are deficient in
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish of-
fenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having juris-
diction.., is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and gov-
ern ... in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1996).
28. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 n.14 (1973); In re Es-
tate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1994); Davis v. Oregon State Univ.,
591 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1978). For a recent academic discussion of the
§ 1983 survival issue generally, see Michael LeBoff, Comment, A Need for Uni-
formity: Survivorship Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 221 (1998).
29. See, e.g., Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230, 232 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(stating that "California's survivorship statute ... specifically excludes damages
for a decedent's pain and suffering"); Denton v. Superior Court, 945 P.2d 1283,
1287 (Ariz. 1997) (noting that "[Arizona's] survival statute prevents recovery of
pain and suffering damages"); cf. Kirk v. Washington State Univ., 746 P.2d 285,
292 (Wash. 1987) (observing that damages for pain and suffering were "ex-
pressly barred from recovery" under the then applicable Washington survival
statute).
30. See Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586; Harrington v. Flanders, 407 P.2d
946, 948 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965). On the other hand, some state survival statutes
specifically authorize the recovery of damages attributable to the decedent's
pain and suffering. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046(1) (1996); Alsenz v.
Clark County Sch. Dist., 864 P.2d 285, 287-88 (Nev. 1993) (discussing NEV.
REV. STAT ANN. § 41.100 (Michie Supp. 1993)). Indeed, "pain and suffering sus-
tained prior to death is recoverable in a majority of jurisdictions." Guyton, 532
F. Supp. at 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981); see also Greene v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466
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challenge the application of these limitations in § 1983 ac-
tions, arguing that they are inconsistent with § 1983's deter-
rent and compensatory purposes."
There is no controlling Supreme Court precedent on this
question,32 and many lower courts, including the Ninth Cir-
cuit, have also reserved judgment on the issue.33 However,
several state tribunals and federal district courts within the
Ninth Circuit have addressed it.34 Those cases are the pri-
mary focus of this article, although they are not necessarily
indicative of how the Ninth Circuit itself would decide the is-
sue.35 Indeed, the lower courts in the Ninth Circuit are not in
agreement as to how to decide the issue.36
In Part II, this article discusses the Supreme Court's con-
sideration of the interplay between § 1983 and state survival
F.2d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 1972) ("The majority of states.., permit recovery for
pain and suffering under survival statutes.").
31. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248, 1250 (E.D.
Wash. 1987); Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
32. See Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 583-84.
33. See Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1417 n.8 (9th Cir. 1987)
("We express no view here as to whether the remedies authorized by California's
survival statute, pecuniary and punitive damages but not damages for pain and
suffering, are too limited to be 'consistent' with the Civil Rights Act's statutory
scheme and whether federal law, therefore, provides an independent source of
recovery for a broad array of damages."); Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F.
Supp. 1074, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Relatively few cases have addressed
whether the limitations on recovery contained in a state survivorship statute
are inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983."). But see Espinoza v. Dunn,
No. 91-56353, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 955, at *4 n.1 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1993) (not-
ing plaintiffs' counsel's acknowledgment that "under California law, [a dece-
dent's § 1983] claim for damages based on pain and suffering does not survive
his death").
34. State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims,
see Brown v. Pitchess, 531 P.2d 772, 774-75 (Cal. 1975), and "[p]laintiffs often
bring federal civil rights actions under ... section 1983 in state court rather
than in federal court," County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 981 P.2d 68, 71
(Cal. 1999). However, one court in the Ninth Circuit recently noted that most of
the cases addressing the issue explored here have arisen in the Seventh Circuit.
See Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584 (citing, inter alia, Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984)).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Vega-Gomez, No. 93-55963, 1994 U.S. LEXIS
646, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 1993) ("[T]his Court is not bound by decisions of the
district court."); Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230, 233 n.7 (S.D. Cal. 1997)
(observing that federal courts are "not bound by state court decisions regarding
the issue ... [of] whether application of [a state] survivorship statute would be
contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States").
36. See Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. at 233 (noting the disagreement among
Ninth Circuit courts).
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statutes,37 and in particular its seminal decision in Robertson
v. Wegmann." Part III then analyzes various cases arising in
the Ninth Circuit39 that have considered whether state sur-
vival statutes precluding recovery for a decedent's pain and
suffering are inconsistent with the compensatory and deter-
rent purposes of § 1983.40 The article ultimately concludes, in
Part IV, that such statutes may be inconsistent with § 1983's
deterrent purpose in cases in which the constitutional depri-
vation at issue results in death, but are not inconsistent with
§ 1983 where the victim's death is unrelated to the constitu-
tional deprivation.4
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN § 1983 AND STATE SURVIVAL STATUTES
A. Federal Law is Deficient on the Issue of Survival
The fact that § 1983 itself is silent on the issue of sur-
vival, and indeed can be read as not authorizing survival,"
has prompted several courts to characterize federal law as
"deficient" in this area.43 Therefore, courts look to state law in
37. To the extent the Supreme Court has addressed the present issue, its
analysis obviously is controlling. See, e.g., Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582.
38. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978). The Robertson case re-
ceived some scholarly attention even before it reached the Supreme Court. See
William B. Theis, Shaw v. Garrison: Some Observations on 42 U.S.C. § 1988
and Federal Common Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 681 (1976). It has been described as
"perhaps the key to the entire enigma surrounding this issue." Tracy v. Bittles,
820 F. Supp. 396, 399 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 1993). See also LeBoff, supra note 28, at
224 (observing that the Robertson Court "laid down the framework for deter-
mining when state laws apply in § 1983 survival actions").
39. See Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. at 232 (noting the absence of controlling
Ninth Circuit authority).
40. See discussion infra Part III. See generally LeBoff, supra note 28, at
247-48 ("Since the Supreme Court [decided] Robertson, the court system has
been inundated with numerous cases debating what damages may be recov-
ered.").
41. See discussion infra Part IV.
42. See James v. Murphy, 392 F. Supp. 641, 645 (M.D. Ala. 1975) ("[A] good
argument could be made for § 1983 not providing for survival since the lan-
guage of the statute provides remedies only for 'the party injured.'") (discussing
Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961)). But see Hall v. Wooten, 506
F.2d 564, 566 (6th Cir. 1974) ("Although section 1983 provides for liability to
'the party injured,' it does not foreclose survival of the action on behalf of the
estate of the injured party.").
43. See, e.g., Brazier, 293 F.2d at 408-09; Williams v. City of Oakland, 915
F. Supp. 1074, 1075-76 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F.
Supp. 282, 288 (D. Colo. 1982).
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assessing the survival of § 1983 damage claims. 4' This phe-
nomenon places many civil rights plaintiffs, who must argue
that the pertinent state law is inconsistent with § 1983,"4 "in
the anomalous position of relying upon ... the survival stat-
ute for the very life of their lawsuit," while simultaneously
seeking to "strike down that part of it which excludes dam-
ages for pain and suffering."'
B. Effect of State Law on § 1983 Claims
1. Jefferson v. City of Tarrant
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
survival issue under § 1983."7 A variation of the issue was re-
cently presented in Jefferson v. City of Tarrant," where the
Court granted certiorari to review an Alabama Supreme
Court decision49 holding that a state wrongful death statute
limiting the plaintiff's recovery to punitive damages"° applied
44. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1505 (10th Cir.
1990); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1234, 1236 (7th Cir. 1984); Wil-
liams, 915 F. Supp. at 1076. Section 1988's "deficiency clause" permits resort to
state law in federal civil rights cases when federal law is "deficient in the provi-
sions necessary to furnish suitable remedies." Berry, 900 F.2d at 1502 & n.18
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1996)); see also supra note 27.
45. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. This argument is necessarily
premised upon that portion of § 1988 that has been characterized as the "incon-
sistency clause." Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 294. As its name implies, the clause
permits the application of state laws in § 1983 actions only if those laws are "not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988; see also supra note 27.
46. Harrington v. Flanders, 407 P.2d 946, 948 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); cf
Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 662 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (assessing
similar contention that "since the [§ 1983] cause of action would not even sur-
vive the deceased's death without reliance on the [state] act, plaintiff must also
operate under the limitations contained in that act").
47. See Bell, 746 F.2d at 1238; Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
580, 584 (Ct. App. 1996).
48. Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75 (1997). For a more detailed
analysis of Jefferson by one of the attorneys involved in the case, see Wayne
Morse, Death Actions for Federal Rights Violations in Alabama, 29 CUMB. L.
REV. 11 (1999).
49. For an academic discussion of the lower court's decision, see Scott A.
Boykin, Constitutional Torts, Preemption Doctrine, and Alabama's Wrongful
Death Act, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 39 (1998).
50. See Ala. CODE § 6-5-410(a) (1994); see also King v. National Spa & Pool
Inst., 607 So. 2d 1241, 1246 (Ala. 1992) ("[T]he Wrongful Death Act provides
only for punitive damages, and compensation is not a factor in a wrongful death
claim."); Estes Health Care Ctrs. v. Bannerman, 411 So. 2d 109, 112 (Ala. 1982)
("It is settled that under Alabama law (Code 1975, § 6-5-410) the only damages
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in a § 1983 action in which the constitutional deprivation re-
sulted in the victim's death.51 However, the Court in Jefferson
ultimately dismissed the writ of certiorari for want of juris-
diction when it became clear that the matter had been re-
manded to the trial court for further proceedings, and thus
the Alabama Supreme Court's decision was not final."
Justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting from the Court's
dismissal of the writ, asserted that state statutory limitations
on damages have no application in § 1983 actions because
federal law governs the damages recoverable under § 1983.53
Justice Stevens acknowledged that state law may govern the
survival of § 1983 claims, 4 but maintained that where such a
claim does survive, "additional state law limitations on the
particular measure of damages are irrelevant."55
2. Jones v. Hildebrant
Although no other member of the Court joined Justice
Stevens's opinion, one federal district court observed that
Justice Byron White, in his dissent from dismissal of certio-
rari in Jones v. Hildebrant,56 also indicated that state law
recoverable in a wrongful death action are punitive in nature.").
51. See City of Tarrant v. Jefferson, 682 So. 2d 29 (Ala. 1996), cert. dis-
missed as improvidently granted, 522 U.S. 75 (1997). The Alabama Supreme
Court held that "state law applies in § 1983 actions seeking recovery for wrong-
ful death unless.., it is found to unduly restrict the federal claim," and that the
pertinent Alabama statute did not unduly restrict the § 1983 claim at issue in
that case "merely because the statute provides for recovery of only punitive
damages." Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks and authority omitted).
52. See Jefferson, 522 U.S. at 81. One commentator stated that "by granting
certiorari in the first place, the Supreme Court indicated its willingness to con-
sider whether a uniform federal rule of survivorship is necessary to advance the
goals of § 1983 where the misconduct results in death." LeBoff, supra note 28,
at 234.
53. See Jefferson, 522 U.S. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 85-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally O'Connor v. Sev-
eral Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1347 (E.D. Va. 1981)("Many courts have held that state law governs the question of whether an ac-
tion under § 1983 survives the death of the injured party .... ").
55. Id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf. Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900
F.2d 1489, 1503 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The Supreme Court has not directly consid-
ered the issue, but language in [Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978)]
appears to encourage reference to state law in defining the scope and content of
remedies available."); Bass by Lewis v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1188 (7th
Cir. 1985) (holding that courts in § 1983 actions are to "look to the most closely
analogous state law to determine survivability and the appropriate measure of
damages") (emphasis added).
56. Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183 (1977). Jones involved a § 1983 claim
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damage limitations do not apply in § 1983 actions.57 In actu-
ality, Justice White acknowledged that state law may be rele-
vant in assessing the remedies available in § 1983 actions."
However, his opinion in Jones also suggests that, at least in
some cases, Justice White might subscribe to Justice Stev-
ens's analysis in Jefferson."
In particular, Justice White stated that "it is by no means
clear that state law may serve as a limitation on recovery
where the remedy provided under state law is inadequate to
implement the purposes of § 1983.""0 This observation may
suggest that a state survival statute could expand,6 but not
contract, the damages available under § 1983.62
asserted by the mother of a police shooting victim on her own behalf rather than
as a representative of the decedent's estate. See id. at 183-84. The Court dis-
missed the writ of certiorari when the issue as framed during oral argument di-
verged from the question raised in the petition for certiorari, which involved the
extent to which state statutory damage limitations apply in § 1983 wrongful
death actions. See id. at 184-89.
57. Sager v. Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 293 (D. Colo. 1982) (citing
Jones, 432 U.S. at 190 (White, J., dissenting)); see also Bell v. City of Milwau-
kee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1252 (7th Cir. 1984) (observing that "both the majority and
the dissent [in Jones] questioned the applicability of state damage restrictions
on a beneficiary's Section 1983 action where the deprivation of a [constitutional]
right caused death").
58. See Jones, 432 U.S. at 190 (White, J., dissenting).
59. See Esposito v. Buonome, 647 F. Supp. 580, 583-84 (D. Conn. 1986)
(citing Justice White's opinion in Jones for the proposition that "state limita-
tions on damages that do not serve policies underlying § 1983 should not limit
those remedies"). However, Justice Stevens did not join Justice White's opinion
in Jones.
60. Jones, 432 U.S. at 190 (White, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373, 379 (Ala. 1983)
(discussing a state statute that "affords a remedy beyond that ... permitted un-
der federal law" and thus "does not, in substance, abrogate [a] plaintiffs rem-
edy.., for violations of § 1983, but rather expands the recovery"); Seth F.
Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section
1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 632 (1985) ("[I]n most situations, it is not incon-
sistent with the policies underlying section 1983 for a state statute to impose a
higher level of... damages than is available under federal law.").
62. See DeMarco v. Sadiker, 952 F. Supp. 134, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Sager,
543 F. Supp. at 294; see also Shaw v. Garrison, 545 F.2d 980, 986 (5th Cir. 1977)
(observing that "state survival statutes have primarily been considered when
their effect on the plaintiffs [§ 1983] case was beneficial"), rev'd sub nom. Rob-
ertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 157
(8th Cir. 1961) (stating that "Congress by the language ... in § 1988 intended to
enlarge the civil right remedy by authorizing resort to state law"); Theis, supra
note 38, at 688 ("Generally, state statutes have been considered only for the
beneficial effect they would have on the plaintiffs case.").
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3. Robertson v. Wegmann
Despite the views expressed in Jefferson and Jones, sev-
eral courts rely on the United States Supreme Court decision
in Robertson v. Wegman63 in rejecting the conclusion that the
survival of remedies in § 1983 litigation is governed by fed-
eral law. 4 Robertson involved a § 1983 claim premised upon
a state district attorney's alleged bad faith criminal prosecu-
tion of the plaintiff.65 The plaintiff died while the action was
pending,6 leaving no close surviving relatives. 7 The executor
of the decedent's estate then sought to be substituted as a
party68 in order to pursue the action on the estate's behalf.69
However, the applicable state survival statute only permitted
claims to survive in favor of the spouse, children, parents, or
siblings of a decedent. ° In Robertson there were no surviving
relatives within the class established by the statute,71 thus
63. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 584.
64. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (indicating that the Supreme Court has rejected the federal common law
approach); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (reject-
ing as contrary to the Supreme Court's "present interpretation" of § 1983 the
proposition that the survival of remedies in a § 1983 action is governed by "fed-
eral common law without regard to state law"), disapproved on other grounds in
Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984).
65. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 586. The prosecutions involved the alleged
Kennedy assassination conspiracy that later provided inspiration for the con-
troversial Oliver Stone film JFK. See Russo v. Conde Nast Publications, 806 F.
Supp. 603, 608 & nn.24-25 (E.D. La. 1992).
66. Prior to his death, the plaintiff obtained a federal injunction prohibiting
further state court prosecution of the criminal charges then pending against
him. See Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1971), affd, 467 F.2d
113 (5th Cir. 1972).
67. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 585, 587.
68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25(a) ("If a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper party.").
69. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 586-87.
70. See id. at 587, 591. The statute provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
The right to recover ... damages caused by an offense or quasi offense,
if the injured person dies, shall survive ... in favor of: (1) the surviving
spouse and child or children of the deceased or either such spouse or
such child or children; (2) the surviving father and mother of the de-
ceased, or either of them, if he left no spouse or child surviving; and (3)
the surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he
left no spouse, child, or parent surviving.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1973).
71. The Louisiana Court of Appeal held that "[t]he chosen classes reasona-
bly embrace those individuals that are likely to be most affected by the death of
the deceased and reflect a reasonably appropriate limitation on [the survival]
right of action." Allen v. Burrow, 505 So. 2d 880, 888 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
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the statute required the abatement of the action. 2 Both the
trial and appellate courts concluded that the abatement of the
action would be inconsistent with § 1983,"3 and purported to
establish a federal common law rule74 permitting the dece-
dent's claim to survive."
The Supreme Court reversed," and applied the state
statute to bar the decedent's § 1983 claim.77 The Court began
by noting that because federal law is silent on the issue, the
survival of § 1983 claims is generally determined through ref-
erence to analogous state law.78 The exception to this general
rule occurs where application of the pertinent state law-in
this case a state survival statute-would be inconsistent with
federal law.79
The Court explained that in determining whether a state
survival statute is inconsistent with federal law, courts must
look not only to the language of the pertinent federal statute,
but also to the policies underlying that statute.80 The Court
then noted that the principal policies underlying § 1983 are
(1) compensating for injuries to persons who have been de-
prived of their federal rights, and (2) deterring abuses of
72. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 587.
73. The Court of Appeal, for example, stated that "[b]ecause Louisiana's
survivorship provisions would cause [the] pending civil rights action to abate,
we find that Louisiana law is inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes
embodied in the Civil Rights Acts." Shaw v. Garrison, 545 F.2d 980, 983 (5th
Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 584. See generally Goad v.
Macon County, 730 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) (discussing lower
court decisions in Robertson); Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282,
294 n.14 (D. Colo. 1982) (same).
74. See generally Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1510 (10th Cir.
1990) (Tacha, J., concurring) (stating that where the "state law remedy for a
survival action [is] inadequate, the court should fashion a federal common law
remedy responsive to the federal policies underlying section 1983"); Theis, supra
note 38, at 683 ("If the adequate protection of civil rights requires survival ac-
tions for their deprivation, state law may help accomplish that end. However, if
state law is inadequate for the task, then federal common law, in conflict with
state statute, must be pressed into service.").
75. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 587-88, 590.
76. See id. at 588.
77. See id. at 593-95.
78. See id. at 589-90 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1996), which permits resort to
state law where federal remedial provisions are "deficient"). But cf. Miller v.
Apartments & Homes of N.J., 646 F.2d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The [Robertson
Court's] decision that federal law is 'deficient' with respect to survival was brief
and conclusory.").
79. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588, 590 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
80. See id. at 590.
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authority by individuals acting under color of state law.81
The Court held that application of the pertinent survival
statute was not inconsistent with § 1983 merely because it
would cause the plaintiff to lose the litigation.82 The Court
noted that § 1983's goal of compensating persons who have
been deprived of their federal rights provides no basis for
authorizing recovery by an individual suing as executor of a
decedent's estate.83 In other words, § 1983's compensatory
purpose was not undermined by the state survival statute be-
cause the substituted plaintiff in Robertson was not within
the class of persons protected by § 1983.84
The Court also held the abatement of a particular action
would not undermine § 1983's role as a deterrent, 5 at least in
cases where the constitutional deprivation did not cause the
victim's death.8 The Court explained that because the state
81. See id. at 590-91. The Ninth Circuit observed that "while perhaps not
the prominent purpose, punishment is [also] a permissible purpose of § 1983
liability." Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 648 (9th Cir. 1991); cf.
Sager v. Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 296 n.16 (D. Colo. 1982) (referring to
"a third purpose under § 1983-retribution").
82. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 593. The Court explained:
That a federal remedy should be available.., does not mean that a §
1983 plaintiff (or his representative) must be allowed to continue an ac-
tion in disregard of the state law to which § 1983 refers us.... If suc-
cess of the § 1988 action were the only benchmark, there would be no
reason at all to look to state law, for the appropriate rule would then
always be the one favoring the plaintiff, and its source would be essen-
tially irrelevant. But § 1988 quite clearly instructs us to refer to state
statutes; it does not say that state law is to be accepted or rejected
based solely on which side is advantaged thereby.
Id.
83. See id. at 592.
84. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 295 (observing that the Court in Robertson
concluded that "[Section] 1983's policy of compensating injured persons would
not be undermined by Louisiana's survival law since mere executors are not
truly injured parties pursuant to § 1983"). But cf. Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So. 2d
207, 209 (La. Ct. App.) (noting that "federal statutory law does not address...
who the injured parties are when the victim is killed"), review denied, 472 So. 2d
919 (La. 1985).
85. The Court found "nothing in [§ 1983] or its underlying policies to indi-
cate that a state law causing abatement of a particular action should invariably
be ignored in favor of a rule of absolute survivorship." Robertson, 436 U.S. at
590.
86. See id. at 592. One court stated, somewhat exaggeratedly, that the Rob-
ertson Court "repeatedly emphasized that its decision to apply the Louisiana
statute to the detriment of the plaintiffs case might be inappropriate in cases
where the alleged misconduct caused the plaintiffs death." Weeks v. Benton,
649 F. Supp. 1297, 1306 n.8 (S.D. Ala. 1986); cf. McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d
907, 911 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that the Robertson Court "pointedly distin-
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statute permitted most actions to survive the victim's death,87
even state officials contemplating illegal activity who were
familiar with the statute would be cognizant of their potential
liability under § 1983.88 Given the virtual impossibility of
purposely selecting victims who would subsequently die from
causes unrelated to the constitutional deprivation,89 leaving
no surviving next of kin,9° the Court concluded that applica-
tion of the state survival statute was unlikely to have even a
marginal influence on the future behavior of such officials. 91
It therefore held that the original plaintiffs § 1983 claim
abated upon his death, noting as a general proposition that
state survival statutes apply in § 1983 actions unless they
have an independent adverse effect on, and are generally in-
hospitable to, the policies underlying § 1983.92
Robertson did not involve a state statutory limitation on
the remedies available under § 1983. 93  Indeed, claims for
compensatory damages, including pain and suffering, clearly
survive under the state statute at issue in that case.94 Thus,
although the reasoning in Robertson may be instructive in
analyzing survival statutes that preclude recovery for the de-
guished a section 1983 claim for a deprivation of federally protected rights that
caused the decedent's death").
87. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 591, 592, 594; see also Sager, 543 F. Supp. at
295 ("[T]he Robertson court held that § 1983's policy of deterring abuses of
power by those acting under color of state law would not be thwarted by appeal
to Louisiana state law since most people do not die unsurvived by family and,
therefore, most actions would survive the plaintiffs death.").
88. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592.
89. See id. at 592 n.10 (dismissing the suggestion that state officials could
"deliberately... select as victims only those persons who would die before con-
clusion of the § 1983 suit for reasons entirely unconnected with the official ille-
gality") (parentheses omitted).
90. See id. at 593 (noting that the § 1983 claim abated because the victim of
the constitutional deprivation "was not survived by one of several close rela-
tives" specified in the state statute); see also Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F.
Supp. 1074, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (asserting that the § 1983 claim in Robertson
abated "only because the plaintiff had no next of kin survivors").
91. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592 n.10.
92. See id. at 594.
93. See Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 82 n.2 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (discussing Robertson); cf. Miller v. Apartments & Homes of N.J.,
646 F.2d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 1981) ("In Robertson, the Supreme Court decided that
state law governs some issues of survival of section 1983 causes of action.") (em-
phasis added).
94. See Thomas v. Frederick, 766 F. Supp. 540, 559-60 (W.D. La. 1991); see
also Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, 529 F. Supp. 634, 640 (W.D. La. 1982).
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cedent's pain and suffering," it is not dispositive of whether
such statutes are inconsistent with § 1983.9" In any event,
the lower courts in the Ninth Circuit have relied upon Robert-
son when considering such statutes. These courts have
reached differing results.97
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF ROBERTSON IN§ 1983 CASES INVOLVING STATE DAMAGE LIMITATIONS
A. The Impact of State Damage Limitations on § 1983's
Deterrent Objective
1. Where Death Results from the Constitutional
Deprivation
a. Guyton v. Phillips and Its Progeny
In the Ninth Circuit, the first significant consideration of
a § 1983 plaintiffs right to recover for pain and suffering ex-
perienced prior to death occurred in Guyton v. Phillips."5 In
that case, the plaintiff asserted a § 1983 claim on behalf of
her deceased son, who had been shot and killed by two police
officers .
The Guyton case was tried to the court sitting without a
95. See Burns v. City of Scottsdale, No. CIV 96-0578-PHX-RGS, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13961, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 1998); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F.
Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981), disapproved on other grounds in Peraza v.
Delemeter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984); Garcia v. Superior Court, 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 583-84 (Ct. App. 1996).
96. See Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 583. See generally Weeks v. Benton, 649
F. Supp. 1297, 1308 (S.D. Ala. 1986) ("A number of... courts have held that re-
strictions on recoverable damages in state ... survival statutes are inconsistent
with federal law and therefore not applicable in § 1983 actions.").
97. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
98. Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1154. The survival of § 1983 claims had previ-
ously been discussed, but not specifically resolved, in Galindo v. Brownell, 255
F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Cal. 1966), a case decided several years before the Supreme
Court's decision in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
99. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1156, 1159. A police officer's use of deadly
force is a seizure subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and
thus, where unreasonable, may give rise to liability under § 1983. See Tennes-
see v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). The Guyton court itself observed: "It is
axiomatic that a police officer's use of excessive force resulting in death consti-
tutes a deprivation of fundamental rights." Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1164 (cita-
tions omitted). For a scholarly discussion of this issue, see Michael R. Smith,
Police Use of Deadly Force: How Courts and Policy-Makers Have Misapplied
Tennessee v. Garner, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 100 (1998).
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jury.' The plaintiff presented evidence that for a brief period
after being shot and prior to dying, the decedent consciously
suffered pain."' The Ninth Circuit has observed that "in or-
der for a decedent's beneficiaries to recover damages for a de-
cedent's pain and suffering, it is necessary to establish that
the decedent was conscious for at least some period of time af-
ter he suffered the injuries which resulted in his death.1 1 2
Thus, the Guyton court was presented with the question of
whether the plaintiff was precluded from recovering for that
pain and suffering 3 because the California survival statute's
prohibition of such a recovery applied to the decedent's § 1983
claims. 10
The court concluded that an interpretation of § 1983 that
permits recovery for pain and suffering only when the victim
survives (which would have been the effect of applying the
state survival statute) would deter conduct that injures an
individual while providing little or no deterrence to conduct
that results in the victim's death.' Some courts suggest that
100. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1159. Section 1983 claims are generally
jury-eligible. See, e.g., Keller v. Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 954 (4th
Cir. 1987) ("Persons seeking monetary damages under § 1983 have a right to a
jury trial under the seventh amendment.").
101. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1167.
102. Cook v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 626 F.2d 746, 749-50 (9th Cir.
1980). "In most jurisdictions recovery for pain and suffering is precluded where
death is instantaneous or the victim is unconscious from the time the injury oc-
curred until death." Ingram v. Howard-Needles-Tammen & Bergendoff, 672
P.2d 1083, 1092 (Kan. 1983) (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting).
103. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1164.
104. The current version of California's survival statute, CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 377.34 (West 1973 & Supp. 1999), is substantively identical to the ver-
sion at issue in Guyton, CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997). See
Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 935 P.2d 781, 789-90 & n.6 (Cal. 1997). The
current version states:
In an action or proceeding by a decedent's personal representative or
successor in interest on the decedent's cause of action, the damages re-
coverable are limited to the loss or damage that the decedent sustained
or incurred before death, including any penalties or punitive or exem-
plary damages that the decedent would have been entitled to recover
had the decedent lived, and do not include damages for pain, suffering,
or disfigurement.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34. The California legislature has resisted efforts
to eliminate this statutory exclusion. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 394 n.24 (Ct. App. 1981).
105. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1166; cf. O'Connor v. Several Unknown Cor-
rectional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1981) ("If a state rule, bar-
ring suit where the defendant's acts resulted in the death of the injured party,
were allowed to prevail, a state official contemplating such severe conduct
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in a case like Guyton, this phenomenon might encourage po-
lice officers to inflict force upon suspects "to the point of
death. 1 1 6 Because one purpose of § 1983 is to prevent abuse
of official acts that result in a deprivation of rights,' 7 and in
particular those that result in the victim's death, °8 the Guy-
ton court concluded that applying the state survival statute
would be inconsistent with § 1983's deterrent objective." 9 The
court maintained that awarding the plaintiff damages for the
decedent's pain and suffering was consistent with the "narrow
ruling and discussion by the Supreme Court in Robertson,"0
where (unlike in Guyton) the alleged constitutional depriva-
tion was unrelated to the victim's death."1
Although Guyton, a district court decision, is not binding
on other courts in the Ninth Circuit,1 2 Davis v. City of Ellens-
burg"' specifically adopted the Guyton reasoning.1  Like
would face no deterrent whatsoever.").
106. Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1983);
see also LeBoff, supra note 28, at 240 (noting that "if damages available if the
victim lives are not available if the victim dies then state officials will not have
a deterrent, but rather an incentive to kill instead of merely injuring their vic-
tims."); cf. Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1167 (expressing concern that § 1983's deter-
rent purpose will not be appropriately served if "the police officer who acts
without justification suffers a harsher penalty for injuring or maiming a victim
than for killing him").
107. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1167; see also Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746
F.2d 1205, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984).
108. See Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 294 (D. Colo.
1982) (observing that "constitutional injuries are most pernicious ... when
death results"); Larson v. Wind, 542 F. Supp. 25, 27 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("[W]e
wish to deter most powerfully malicious and intentional deprivations of a plain-
tiffs civil rights resulting in death."). See generally Bell, 746 F.2d at 1239 ("The
legislative history behind Section 1983 expresses an unequivocal concern for
protecting life.").
109. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1166; cf. O'Connor, 523 F. Supp. at 1348
(holding that a state statute providing "no deterrent" to "acts result[ing] in the
death of the injured party" would "clearly be inconsistent with the § 1983 policy
of deterring constitutional deprivations by state officials").
110. Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1166. The Supreme Court itself had character-
ized its holding in Robertson as a "narrow one." See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436
U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
111. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1165 (characterizing Robertson).
112. See, e.g., Kessler v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 573 F.2d 577, 579 (9th
Cir. 1977) ("Decisions of district courts may persuade other courts by the force
of the supporting rationale, but they are not binding in any other case, even be-
fore the same judge who rendered the decision, nor upon any other court.");
Starbuck v. City and County of San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450, 457 n.13 (9th Cir.
1977) ("The doctrine of stare decisis does not compel one district court judge to
follow the decision of another.").
113. Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Wash. 1987).
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Guyton, Davis arose out of the death of an individual during
his arrest."' Relying on Robertson, the defendants argued
that the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims were subject to a provision
in Washington's survival statute precluding recovery for
"pain and suffering . . .personal to and suffered by a de-
ceased.""6  The plaintiffs, in turn, urged the court to follow
Guyton in disregarding the state statutory damage limitation,
arguing that the limitation was inconsistent with § 1983's de-
terrent objective. 7 They claimed that the defendants' reli-
ance on Robertson was misplaced because the facts in Davis
were more analogous to those in Guyton in that the alleged
constitutional deprivation was the cause of the victim's
death." 8
The Davis court agreed that the holding in Robertson
should not be extended to cases where a constitutional viola-
tion results in the victim's death."9 The court held that ap-
plying a state survival statute that excludes damages for pain
and suffering in such a case would be inconsistent with §
1983 because wrongdoers would not be sufficiently deterred
from killing their victims."' Quoting Guyton, the court stated
that applying such a statute in cases where the constitutional
deprivation results in death would create a "substantial de-
terrent effect to conduct that results in the injury of an indi-
vidual but virtually no deterrent to conduct that kills the vic-
tim."
12
'
The Davis court also relied on the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion in Bell v. City of Milwaukee .22 In Bell, a police shooting
114. See id. at 1255-56.
115. See id. at 1249.
116. Id. at 1255-56. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046(1) (1988). However,
the statute was amended in 1993, see 1993 Wash. Laws. Ch. 44, sec. 1, and now
specifically permits the decedent's personal representative to recover for the de-
cedent's pain and suffering. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046(1) (1996); see also
Steve Andrews, Comment, Survivability of Noneconomic Damages for Tortious
Death in Washington, 21 SEArrLE U. L. REV. 625, 645 (1998) (observing that
"the post 1993 general survival statute no longer precludes damages for pain
[and] suffering").
117. See Davis, 651 F. Supp. at 1250.
118. See id. at 1250-51; cf. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), disapproved on other grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d
1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984).
119. See Davis, 651 F. Supp. at 1253, 1256.
120. See id. at 1255-56.
121. Id. at 1256 (quoting Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1166).
122. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); see Davis, 651
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victim's surviving relatives brought suit under § 1983.23 The
defendants argued that state statutory restrictions upon the
recovery available in wrongful death actions'24 applied to limit
the damages recoverable in connection with the plaintiffs'
§ 1983 claims. 125
Noting that there is no federal statute addressing the
survival of § 1983 actions or specifying the damages recover-
able in such actions,1 26 the Seventh Circuit concluded that it
must look to state law for guidance on those issues, unless
that law is inconsistent with the federal civil rights laws.'27
The court then proceeded to analyze the applicable state
statutes, and rejected the provisions limiting the recovery
available to the plaintiffs because these provisions were in-
consistent with the deterrent policy underlying § 1983.128
Relying in part upon Guyton, the Bell court noted that where
a constitutional deprivation results in the victim's death, ap-
plication of such limitations would result in "more than a
marginal loss of influence on potentially unconstitutional ac-
tors.' ' 21 In addition, such limitations would inhibit § 1983's
ability to deter unlawful conduct, in part because it would be
"more advantageous to the unlawful actor to kill rather than
to injure."''
Characterizing Bell as the leading case on the subject,'
F. Supp. at 1250, 1253-57.
123. See Bell, 746 F.2d at 1214, 1224.
124. The court noted that "recovery in a Wisconsin wrongful death action...
cannot include damages for the loss of life itself," and that Wisconsin law also
"does not allow the victim's estate to recover punitive damages." Id. at 1235,
1241.
125. See id. at 1225-26, 1234-35.
126. See id. at 1234.
127. See id. at 1234, 1236.
128. See id. at 1240. In view of its analysis of § 1983's deterrent purpose, the
court found it "unnecessary to address whether Section 1983 compensation pol-
icy is necessarily inconsistent with [a state] policy of noncompensation where
the victim by virtue of death cannot be made whole." Id. at 1240 n.42.
129. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1239. The Bell court here undoubtedly was responding
to the Supreme Court's rejection of the suggestion that the state survival stat-
ute at issue in Robertson had "even a marginal influence on behavior." Robert-
son v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 n.10 (1978).
130. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1239.
131. See Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (E.D. Wash.
1987); see also Tracy v. Bittles, 820 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (describ-
ing Bell as "[a]n important Seventh Circuit opinion in this area"); Garcia v. Su-
perior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 584 (Ct. App. 1996) (asserting that the pres-
ent issue has arisen "primarily in the... Seventh Circuit," and describing Bell
[Vol. 40428
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the court in Davis relied on its reasoning"' and the similar
analysis in Guyton'33 to conclude that where a constitutional
deprivation causes the victim's death,' a survival statute's
preclusion of recovery for the decedent's pain and suffering is
inconsistent with § 1983's deterrent purpose.'35 Other courts
in the Ninth Circuit have also indicated that Guyton and Bell
stand for the proposition that where a constitutional depriva-
tion results in death, the deterrent policy underlying § 1983
permits the decedent's survivors to recover for the decedent's
pain and suffering.
136
b. Garcia v. Superior Court
Ironically, it was in part the same deterrent concerns ex-
pressed in Guyton v. Phillips,'37 Bell v. City of Milwaukee,3 '
and Davis v. City of Ellensburg39 that prompted the enact-
ment of many state survival statutes. 140  In Warner v.
McCaughan,1' for example, the court noted that the Wash-
as "that circuit court's leading decision" on the issue); Steinglass, supra note t,
at 631 (characterizing Bell as "the leading federal court of appeals § 1983
wrongful death case").
132. The damages at issue in Bell were for "the loss of [the decedent's] life
and enjoyment thereof," and not for his pain and suffering. Bell, 746 F.2d at
1234; see supra note 124. However, the distinction presumably was of no sig-
nificance to the Davis court because in Washington, where Davis arose, the
courts characterized "the lost enjoyment of life's pleasures as merely a compo-
nent of damages for pain and suffering-items of damage specifically excluded
by [the former survival statute]." Woolridge v. Woolett, 638 P.2d 566, 569
(Wash. 1981).
133. See Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584 (indicating that Bell and Guyton are
in the same "line of cases").
134. See Davis, 651 F. Supp. at 1250-51, 1253.
135. See id. at 1255-56.
136. See, e.g., Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584 (rejecting that view); see also
Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230, 232 & n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
137. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981), disapproved on
other grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455,1457 (9th Cir. 1984).
138. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
139. Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Wash. 1987).
140. In In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, 778 F. Supp. 625,
631 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ospina v. Trans World
Airlines, 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992), the court noted that "the majority of Ameri-
can states now permit some kind of survival action," and that those states gen-
erally permit the recovery of damages "for conscious pain and suffering in per-
sonal injury cases." The court added that "[t]his development is consistent with
the current economic and conceptual underpinnings of modern American tort
law," including "deterrence against future delicts by the wrongdoer." Id.
141. Warner v. McCaughan, 460 P.2d 272 (Wash. 1969).
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ington survival statute at issue in Davis142 reflected the
Washington state legislature's intent to abrogate the common
law rule that tort claims abate upon the death of the injured
party. 141 According to Warner, it was the fact that the com-
mon law rule made it "more profitable for the defendant to
kill the plaintiff than to scratch him," that motivated the
Washington legislature.144 Other courts have also alluded to
the potential anti-deterrent implications of the common law
rule. 1
45
However, these concerns with the common law rule did
not prevent many of the same state legislatures from exclud-
ing damages for pain and suffering from the remedies avail-
able under their survival statutes. 146 Further, many courts in
those states have upheld these statutory schemes against
various challenges. 47 One of the premises implicitly under-
lying exclusion of damages for pain and suffering is that be-
cause such damages are simply one component of a broader
compensatory damage scheme,148 the exclusion of such dam-
142. See Davis, 651 F. Supp. at 1250.
143. See Warner, 460 P.2d at 274-75; see also Brodie v. Washington Water
Power Co., 159 P. 791, 791 (Wash. 1916).
144. Warner, 460 P.2d at 275 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 121, at 924 (3d ed. 1964)); see also Cavazos v. Franklin, 867 P.2d 674, 677
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (observing that "the old twist of common law... made it
more profitable to kill than to injure"); cf. Inflight Explosion, 778 F. Supp. at
630 ("A survival action insures that a tortfeasor will not do better by killing
rather than by simply injuring.").
145. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Lane & Co., 298 F. Supp. 194, 195 (E.D. La. 1964)
(stating that the common law rule made it "cheaper for the defendant to kill a
person than to tweak his nose"); Variety Children's Hosp. v. Perkins, 445 So. 2d
1010, 1012 (Fla. 1983).
At common law a person's right to sue for personal injuries terminated
with his death. This created the anomaly that a tortfeasor who would
normally be liable for damages caused by his tortious conduct would
not be liable in situations where the damages were so severe as to re-
sult in death.
Id.; Milton v. Cary Med. Ctr., 538 A.2d 252, 253 n.8 (Me. 1988) ("At common
law, an action for injuries resulting in death could not be maintained. Because
the tort died with the injured person, 'it was more profitable for the defendant
to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him."') (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 127, at 902 (4th ed. 1971)).
146. See, e.g., O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104, 1115-16 n.34
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Eades v. House, 413 P.2d 576, 578 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966);
Cavazos, 867 P.2d at 678; Harvey v. Cleman, 400 P.2d 87, 89-90 (Wash. 1965).
147. See, e.g., Harrington v. Flanders, 407 P.2d 946, 947-48 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1965); Martin v. United Sec. Servs. Inc., 314 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1975).
148. See Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 484 (Ohio
1992) ("One of the elements of compensatory damages that is universally al-
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ages from the remedies preserved by a survival statute is
likely to have little impact on state law deterrence objec-
tives.149
The view that such limitations are likewise not inconsis-
tent with § 1983's similar deterrent objective1' is perhaps
best represented by the California Court of Appeal's decision
in Garcia v. Superior Court."' In Garcia, the plaintiff
brought suit under § 1983 in her capacity as the personal rep-
resentative of her deceased brother's estate, alleging her
brother died as the result of excessive force inflicted by police
officers during his arrest."'
Relying on the successor to the California survival stat-
ute at issue in Guyton,"3 the trial court in Garcia struck the
plaintiffs claim for pain and suffering damages."' The plain-
tiff then sought appellate review, arguing that the pertinent
provisions of the state statute were inconsistent with federal
law, and the policies underlying § 1983 entitled her to recover
lowed in actions for personal injuries is the pain and suffering endured by the
plaintiff as a result of the injury.").
149. In other words, precluding the recovery of damages for pain and suffer-
ing under a survival statute does not mean that the plaintiff will necessarily be
left without a remedy, see, e.g., Harvey, 400 P.2d at 90 (noting that "[a]ny other
element of damage... would appear to survive" under the Washington survival
statute), and the damages that do survive may provide a sufficient deterrent.
See, e.g., Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Ct. App. 1996) (re-
ferring to "the deterrent potential of punitive damages under [a] state survival
statute"); Karen M. Doore, Note, Survival of the Fittest? Waiting Out the Death
of the Plaintiff in ADA Claims: Allred v. Solaray, Inc., 1998 UTAH L. REV. 371,
393 (indicating that deterrence may be accomplished where "even just one
claim" survives) (discussing Rosenblum v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 878 F.
Supp. 1401 (D. Colo. 1994)).
150. See Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala. 1981)
(observing that "deterrence is a goal of both [§ 1983] and [state law]"). But cf
Sager v. Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 293 (D. Colo. 1982) (asserting that
the damages necessary to effectuate § 1983's deterrent objective "may far exceed
those required to satisfy the policies underlying ... state [law]," because § 1983
is intended to deter deprivations of "constitutional rights, not state law rights,"
and the deprivation of a constitutional right is "significantly different from and
more serious than a violation of a state right") (emphasis in original) (quoting
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring), overruled by
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
151. Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580. For a critical assessment of Garcia, see
Felix Shafir, Comment, Flawed Assumptions: A Critique of Garcia v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 301 (1998).
152. See Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581-82.
153. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West 1973 & Supp. 1999); see Gar-
cia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585.
154. See Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581-82.
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for the pain and suffering experienced by her brother prior to
his death.15
While acknowledging the Guyton court's view of the sur-
vival statute's anti-deterrent implications, the California
Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded that § 1983's deter-
rent objective is adequately served by the availability of puni-
tive damages.156 In reaching this conclusion, the court specifi-
cally rejected the portions of Guyton and Bell indicating that
the unavailability of pain and suffering damages would effec-
tively create an incentive for wrongdoers to "kill the victim
rather than merely injure or maim the victim."15 The court
explained:
We are not persuaded by the hypothetical example of a le-
gally knowledgeable actor calculating that he would incur
lesser liability by killing the victim than by injuring the
victim. If we nevertheless indulge in that assumption, we
must also attribute to the actor the knowledge that ... a
jury could punish such conduct with huge exemplary
damages. We believe Bell and Guyton give insufficient
consideration to the deterrent potential of punitive dam-
ages under the state survival statute.' 8
Thus, in the view of the Garcia court, the exclusion of
pain and suffering damages under the California survival
statute is not inconsistent with the policies of § 1983.
c. Reactions to Guyton and Garcia
Another court in the Ninth Circuit, having recently con-
sidered both Guyton and Garcia, found the analysis in Guyton
more persuasive. 9 In Garcia v. Whitehead,6 ' the federal dis-
trict court for the Central District of California rejected the
conclusion that punitive damages provide an adequate deter-
rent in cases where the victim of a constitutional deprivation
is deceased.' In particular, it noted that punitive damages
155. See id.
156. See id. at 585.
157. Id. at 585-86.
158. Id. at 586.
159. See Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230, 232-33 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
But cf. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 361 (Ct.
App. 1996) (concluding that "Garcia's rule ... makes perfect sense on the facts
of that case"), rev'd, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
160. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. at 230.
161. See id. at 233.
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are unavailable in § 1983 actions against municipal defen-
dants,6 2 and are not always warranted against individual de-
fendants.163 Further, even appropriate punitive damages are
likely to be relatively modest' because the amount awarded
is typically based upon the financial condition of the defen-
dants,' 65 who are "not often wealthy individuals." '166 For these
reasons, the deterrent potential of punitive damages in § 1983
cases may be "more imagined than real." 67  Thus, like the
court in Guyton,'68 the Whitehead court held that state sur-
vival statutes precluding recovery for a decedent's pain and
suffering are inconsistent with § 1983's deterrent objective.9
On the other hand, some courts that agree with the re-
sult in Guyton have employed essentially the same reasoning
as the Whitehead court to suggest that the availability of pain
and suffering damages would not have a significant deterrent
effect in § 1983 death actions. These courts cite the limited
amount of pain and suffering damages in such a case for this
result.'7 ° Indeed, the Guyton court itself implicitly acknowl-
162. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); see
also Morse, supra note 48, at 24 ("[A] decedent's estate may be barred from re-
covering compensatory and punitive damages from a municipal defendant in a §
1983 action for injuries to the decedent.").
163. See generally Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) ("[A] jury may be
permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the de-
fendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it
involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of oth-
ers.").
164. See Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. at 233; see also County of Los Angeles, 58
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362 (observing that "punitive damages... can be recovered in
only modest amounts from the typical civil servant").
165. See Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. at 233 (citing Williams v. City of Oakland,
915 F. Supp. 1074, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
166. Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698,
705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
167. County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362 n.7.
168. See Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1151, 1166-67 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
disapproved on other grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th
Cir. 1984).
169. See Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. at 233.
170. See Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal.
1983). In Sharpe v. City of Lewisburg, 677 F. Supp. 1362 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), for
example, the court ordered a new trial in a § 1983 action unless the plaintiff ac-
cepted "a remittitur of $75,000 to an award of $25,000 for pain and suffering,"
because the decedent "could not have lived more than a few minutes from the
time of injury until death." Id. at 1365; see also Steinglass, supra note t, at 660
& n.574 (observing that "the circumstances of persons whose deaths result in
§ 1983... actions often preclude significant damages"). But see In re Marina
Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 248 F. Supp. 15, 28 n.34 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("Sub-
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edged this possibility.171
However, the fact that awards for pain and suffering are
often modest does not support the conclusion that a categori-
cal prohibition of such awards would have no impact on§ 1983's deterrent objective.7 7 As the Whitehead court sug-
gested, in cases where punitive damages are unavailable, 17
the prospect of a pain and suffering award (or other "compen-
satory" damages)' 7 4 may be the only potential deterrent to fu-
ture similar conduct. 175
The analysis in Guyton and its progeny is also subject to
criticism on the ground that it confuses § 1983's compensa-
tory and deterrent purposes, although the two unquestiona-
bly overlap in many cases. 17' For example, the courts in Gar-
cia v. Whitehead177 and Williams v. City of Oakland178
stantial awards have been allowed.., for brief periods of pain and suffering.").
171. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1167 (indicating that in cases where the
constitutional deprivation results in death, the "period of pain and suffering"
may be "brief," and the recovery attributable to that injury therefore modest);
see also Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative
to Traditional Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45,
57-58 (1987) ("Even when the victim of the misconduct prevails at trial, the ac-
tion often provides little compensation and [therefore] has little deterrent effect
on either the officers or their departments.").
172. See generally Jones v. Reagan, 696 F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1983) (ob-
serving that "deterrence [is] accomplished.., by means of damage awards,
compensatory and punitive"); Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F. Supp. 1157, 1194
(D.D.C. 1982) ("Whether it is called compensatory or punitive, the whole award
granted to a plaintiff and against a defendant.., has a deterrent function.")
(citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)).
173. See Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. at 233 ("Even where a constitutional viola-
tion is found, punitive damages are never available against the agency itself in
a section 1983 action, and are not always warranted against the individual de-
fendant.").
174. It has been argued that "pain and suffering damages awarded after the
victim's death are not compensatory," but "in effect, quasi-punitive," because
"the person whom the damages would compensate is unable to receive the bene-
fit of the compensation." Denton v. Superior Court, 945 P.2d 1283, 1286-87
(Ariz. 1997) (emphasis added).
175. See Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1303-09 (S.D. Ala. 1986). But
cf. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1239 n.40 (7th Cir. 1984) ("In some
cases the death of the victim might of course give rise to other claims on behalf
of the survivors.").
176. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 200 (4th Cir.
1990) (discussing the "mixing of compensatory and deterrent functions in the
remedial provisions of a statute"), affd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Minnesota v.
Parker, 538 N.W.2d 141, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) ("It is evident that most civil
remedies have, to some extent, a punitive or deterrent as well as remedial effect
from the viewpoint of the individuals who suffer such sanctions.").
177. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. at 230.
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indicated that the prospect of punitive damages would not
provide an adequate deterrent because the amount awarded
would be dependent upon the financial resources of the par-
ticular defendant involved,'79 rather than the pain and suf-
fering experienced by the decedent."'
To the extent a victim's pain and suffering is indicative of
the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct,' the assump-
tion upon which this reasoning is based may be incorrect112-
the amount of punitive damages awarded may indeed reflect
the decedent's pain and suffering.' Nevertheless, in many
178. Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Wil-
liams is discussed in more detail in Part III.B.2.b. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
179. In California, where Whitehead, Williams, and Guyton all arose, "evi-
dence of the defendant's financial condition is a prerequisite to a punitive dam-
ages award." Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1357 (Cal. 1991). However,
"the view adopted in California ... is not universally held." Chavez v. Keat, 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, 76 (Ct. App. 1995). The Third Circuit, for example, has specifi-
cally "reject[ed] the ... contention that evidence of [the defendant's] financial
status [is] a prerequisite to the imposition of punitive damages." Bennis v. Ga-
ble, 823 F.2d 723, 734 n.14 (3d Cir. 1987).
180. See Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. at 233; Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1078.
181. One court noted that awards for pain and suffering "almost inevitably
reflect[]" the jury's view of the tortfeasor's "degree of moral fault." Freshwater
v. Booth, 233 S.E.2d 312, 316 (W. Va. 1977). See generally Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 54 (1983) (stating that the proper focus in making punitive damage
awards is on the "character of the tortfeasor's conduct"); Vasbinder v. Scott, 976
F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1992) (observing that "a defendant's conduct is obviously
germane to the [punitive] damages issue").
182. In fact, juries contemplating punitive damage awards in California take
into consideration not only the defendant's financial condition, but also the rep-
rehensibility of the defendant's conduct and "the injury, harm, or damage actu-
ally suffered by the plaintiff." Michelson v. Hamada, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 357
n.7 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting standard California jury instruction); cf. Hawkins
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1085 (Ariz. 1987) ("In general, the more rep-
rehensible the defendant's conduct and the more serious the harm likely to oc-
cur, the larger the appropriate [punitive damage award].").
183. In this regard, the California Court of Appeal stated that "an appropri-
ate and reasonable measure of punishment and deterrence can only be deter-
mined in relation to the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff." Gagnon v. Con-
tinental Cas. Co., 260 Cal. Rptr. 305, 307 n.4 (Ct. App. 1989); see also Martini v.
Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 977 F. Supp. 464, 478 (D.D.C. 1997) (upholding a
punitive damages award tied to the pain and suffering inflicted upon the plain-
tiff); Sterner v. Wesley College, 747 F. Supp. 263, 270 (D. Del. 1990) (noting that
"punitive damages are available under... survival action statutes for the pain
and suffering incurred by the deceased prior to death"); cf. Garrick v. City and
County of Denver, 652 F.2d 969, 971 (10th Cir. 1981) (considering the conten-
tion that the jury in a § 1983 action "based the amount of punitive damages on
[the victim's] pain and suffering"); Alabama Power Co. v. Cantrell, 507 So. 2d
1295, 1309 (Ala. 1986) (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting state statutory schemes permitting plaintiffs to introduce "graphic evi-
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§ 1983 cases a punitive damage award undoubtedly would not
be sufficient to compensate for that injury,14 and this may be
particularly true in cases where the constitutional depriva-
tion results in the victim's death.'85 However, this is not to
say (as the Whitehead and Williams courts did) that the pros-
pect of such an award would also serve as an inadequate de-
terrent.8 ' Indeed, it is precisely because punitive damages
are intended to deter future wrongdoing, rather than com-
pensate for the plaintiffs injuries, that an award of such
damages is typically based upon the wealth of the defen-
dant187 and may not necessarily reflect the extent of pain and
suffering experienced by the victim. 8
dence of the decedent's pain and suffering" when seeking "punitive damages in
survival actions") (quoting appellant's brief)).
184. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981)
("Punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured
party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional
or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct."); Vas-
binder, 976 F.2d at 121 (observing that "neither compensation nor enrichment
is a valid purpose of punitive damages").
185. See Sterner, 747 F. Supp. at 270 (holding that "punitive damages are
applicable to the brief period of pain and suffering [the decedent] may have en-
dured"); Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
("Although punitive damages are recoverable in a survival action, these dam-
ages are limited to the punitive damages the decedent would have been entitled
to recover had he lived, and bear no relationship to the fact of the death.") (cita-
tion omitted); see also Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, 935 P.2d 781, 788 (Cal. 1997)
(noting that the California survival statute "allow[s] recovery of punitive dam-
ages that the deceased plaintiff would have been entitled to recover if he or she
had lived").
186. See, e.g., Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230, 233 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(finding unpersuasive "the notion that punitive damages would provide an ade-
quate deterrent effect."); Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074, 1078
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (questioning the deterrent potential of punitive damage awards
in § 1983 actions).
187. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 269 ("[A]llowing juries and courts to as-
sess punitive damages in appropriate circumstances against the offending offi-
cial[] based on his personal financial resources ... directly advances the public's
interest in preventing repeated constitutional deprivations."); Lee v. Edwards,
101 F.3d 805, 813 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[O]ne purpose of punitive damages is deter-
rence, and ... deterrence is directly related to what people can afford to pay.");
Maxwell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 348, 362 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (observ-
ing that "generally the wealthier the defendant the larger the award should be"
in order to "deter others in similar circumstances").
188. In cases in which the victim of a constitutional deprivation is deceased,
this "disconnect" between the victim's pain and suffering and the amount of pu-
nitive damages awarded actually may operate to the plaintiffs benefit. In
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979), for example,
the court postulated a situation in which the defendant intentionally inflicts an
injury "severe enough to cause long term suffering," but "the suffering from that
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In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,'9 for example,
the Supreme Court relied on the availability of punitive dam-
ages against individual defendants in holding that such dam-
ages are not recoverable against municipalities in § 1983 ac-
tions.19 ° The Court specifically concluded that the possibility
of a punitive damage award against an individual defendant
based on his own financial resources not only advances the
public interest in deterrence, but indeed may be a more effec-
tive deterrent than the threat of much larger punitive dam-
age awards against governmental agencies."' Not only does
the analysis in Whitehead and Williams conflict with this
reasoning,' it is also questionable as an empirical matter.193
In addition, the California Court of Appeal's conclusion in
Garcia v. Superior Court1 94 that potential § 1983 defendants
are unlikely to assess whether they could minimize their li-
ability by killing their victims19' seems persuasive.'96 In Carl-
injury is terminated by an intervening and unforeseeable act of God." Id. at
590. In that event, the court indicated, it would not be appropriate to limit the
award of punitive damages by basing it upon the pain and suffering actually
experienced by the plaintiff. See id. But cf. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582
P.2d 980, 990 (Cal. 1978) ("[E]ven an act of considerable reprehensibility will
not be seen to justify a proportionally high amount of punitive damages if the
actual harm suffered thereby is small.").
189. City of Newport, 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
190. See id. at 271.
191. See id. at 268-70; see also Boykin, supra note 49, at 61 ("If the defen-
dant is an official or employee sued in his individual capacity, punitive damages
may well be sufficient to satisfy the deterrent policy of § 1983.").
192. But see Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966) ("[T]he
remote possibility of money damages serves as no deterrent to future police in-
vasions."); Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d
698, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he monetary nature of the deterrent inherent
in a civil rights action misses the mark in virtually all ... situations. The viola-
tors themselves are not often wealthy individuals to whom a significant damage
award would be terribly meaningful.").
193. See, e.g., Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 831
(3d Cir. 1991) (recognizing "the deterrent effect of punitive damage awards on
individuals who violate § 1983"); Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 n.12
(S.D. Ala. 1986) (finding "no evidence that the recovery of punitive damages
against individual defendants under [a state survival] statute would be inade-
quate to satisfy the deterrent ... policies underlying § 1983").
194. Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1996).
195. See id. at 586; supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
196. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 301 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (characterizing as "implausible" the assertion that an individual
contemplating the possible commission of a capital crime will "not only consider
the risk of punishment, but also distinguish between two possible punish-
ments").
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son v. Green,"97 Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent criticized the
suggestion that an actor, relying on the nuances of a state
survival statute, would "intentionally kill [an] individual or
permit him to die, rather than violate his constitutional
rights to a lesser extent, in order to avoid liability."'98 An-
other state court has likewise characterized that assumption
as "too facile for the realities of [most] situations,"'99 and "of
some use only if the actor is consciously bent upon killing the
victim."200 In actuality it may be in this latter circumstance
that a survival statute is least likely to influence the actor's
conduct.20'
In addition to the punitive damages relied upon in Gar-
cia22 there are other potential deterrents to unconstitutional
killings, 23 such as the prospect of criminal liability, 20 4 that
may compensate for the unavailability of pain and suffering
damages under a state survival statute.2 5 In Bell v. City of
197. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
198. Id. at 50-51 n.17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
199. Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698,
705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Carlson, 446 U.S. at 50 n.17 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting)).
200. Id.; cf. O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp.
1345, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1981) (discussing the prospect of "a state official contem-
plating such severe conduct" that it would "result[] in the death of the injured
party").
201. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that
"many, and probably most, capital crimes cannot be deterred by the threat of
punishment").
202. Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 585-86 (Ct. App. 1996).
203. Indeed, "[s]ome courts have held that the threat of litigation [alone] is
sufficient to deter future misconduct." LeBoff, supra note 28, at 242 (citing
Goad v. Macon County, 730 F. Supp. 1425 (M.D. Tenn. 1989)). See generally
Graham v. Sauk Prairie Police Comm'n, 915 F.2d 1085, 1105 (7th Cir. 1990)
(observing that "the overriding concern of § 1983 is deterring unjustified takings
of life").
204. See, e.g., Rosario Nevarez v. Torres Gaztambide, 633 F. Supp. 287, 298
n.15 (D.P.R. 1986) ("Should punitive damages prove to be insufficient to... de-
ter ... pernicious practices, perhaps the next step should be the initiation of
criminal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal counterpart of 42 U.S.C.§ 1983."), rev'd on other grounds, 820 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1987); Morse, supra note
48, at 36 ("[I]t is implausible to suggest that [an individual] will risk criminal
prosecution... because damages are not recoverable against his employer [un-
der § 1983].").
205. One potential deterrent that has received relatively little attention is
the prospect of declaratory or injunctive relief. See Roman v. City of Richmond,
570 F. Supp. 1554, 1556 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("Injunctive relief is a very important
part of the relief sought by plaintiffs in these cases."); Rosario Nevarez, 633 F.
Supp. at 301 ("Equitable relief is a component of a § 1983 action."); cf. Williams
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Milwaukee,"6 for example, one of the police officers named as
a defendant served a prison term for reckless homicide and
perjury as the result of the conduct that caused the victim's
death. 7 and thus formed the basis for the § 1983 claim."'
Many courts consider the possibility of such criminal pun-
ishment to be a more effective deterrent than any prospect of
a damage award under § 1983.209 Even in cases where that is
not true,2 0 the prospect of a significant state law damage
award21' may be a sufficient deterrent to overcome the un-
v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074, 1078 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (recognizing
that "successful plaintiffs... may be able to obtain declaratory or injunctive re-
lief' in § 1983 actions, but asserting that "where the victim is deceased, moot-
ness looms" as an impediment to that remedy). See generally Committee of
Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 682 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 1988) ("Injunc-
tive relief is designed to deter future misdeeds, not to punish for past miscon-
duct.").
206. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
207. See id. at 1223. For a highly publicized example of a criminal conviction
resulting from a civil rights violation that occurred in the Ninth Circuit, see
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (reviewing the convictions of police
officers involved in the infamous Rodney King incident). However, this appears
to be unusual. See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, supra note 171, at 59 (asserting that
"criminal prosecution of police officers for public, official misconduct is rare").
208. The officer also lost his job. See Bell, 746 F.2d at 1222. That prospect
also serves as a potential deterrent, although some observers have suggested
that it is not a sufficient one. See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, supra note 171, at 49
("Revoking an officer's certification ... is a more effective deterrent than merely
terminating his employment with the local police department because the ter-
minated officer may be able to continue in law enforcement by working for a dif-
ferent department within the state.").
209. See, e.g., Rosario Nevarez, 633 F. Supp. at 298 n.15; see also Culver-
Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698, 705 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1993) ("In... cases [where the actor is consciously bent upon killing the
victim,] there are other more clear deterrents in existence, i.e., penalties which
might be imposed for murder or manslaughter."); cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 50 n.17 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (questioning whether "a [civil]
remedy will have a deterrent impact ... beyond that of ordinary criminal sanc-
tions"). See generally Goldman & Puro, supra note 171, at 56 ("Scholars have
long disputed the effectiveness of damage actions brought by victims of police
misconduct as a means of deterring such behavior.").
210. See, e.g., Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 1951) ("Obviously
fear of criminal punishment has been an insufficient deterrent on the police of-
ficers involved in this case, if the averments of the petition be accepted as
true."); Matthew V. Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal
Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, 184 (discussing the
"inefficacy of criminal prosecutions as a tool to deter police misconduct").
211. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 411-12 (7th Cir. 1998) (dis-
cussing administrator's request for "$100,000 in damages on her § 1983 claim
and $2,000,000 in damages on her state-law wrongful death claim," after having
been awarded "$45,000 on her federal claim and $500,000 on her state-law
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availability of pain and suffering damages under § 1983.212
In summary, there is disagreement among the courts in
the Ninth Circuit concerning the propriety of applying a state
survival statute prohibiting recovery for the decedent's pain
and suffering in a § 1983 action in which the alleged constitu-
tional deprivation resulted in the victim's death. Courts that
follow Guyton hold that the state statutory limitation cannot
apply in such a case because the potential for an award of
damages for the decedent's pain and suffering is necessary to
deter conduct that would violate § 1983. On the other hand,
Garcia and other similar cases have applied the state statu-
tory prohibition on the assumption that the availability of
other remedies not prohibited by the survival statute serves
as an adequate deterrent in § 1983 actions.
d. Carlson v. Green
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Carlson v.
Green"' suggests that the analysis in Robertson v. Weg-
mann 14 does not compel the application of a state survival
provision precluding the recovery of damages for the dece-
dent's pain and suffering in cases in which the constitutional
deprivation results in death.21 Carlson involved a claim as-
serted against federal officials directly under the United
States Constitution pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed-
claim" at previous trial). See generally Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp.
661, 665 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (noting "that survivor claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
are often accompanied by pendant state claims resulting from the death of the
alleged victim.").
212. See, e.g., Brown, 518 F. Supp. at 664 ("A tortfeasor who caused death by
his actions would, if found liable under [state law], face a punitive damage
award.., for his wrongful act. Such an award would be imposed against tort-
feasors held liable for acts causing death, thus deterring future misconduct.");
Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
the "significant compensatory damages flowing from the actor's killing of the
victim" under state law provided sufficient deterrence to warrant the applica-
tion of a state survival statute precluding recovery for pain and suffering in
§ 1983 actions). But see Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 293
n.12 (D. Colo. 1982) (observing that "the mere availability of a state remedy
arising from the same transaction underlying a constitutional violation ... does
not generally preclude the availability of a § 1983 action").
213. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
214. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
215. See, e.g., McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing
Robertson and Carlson for the proposition that "limitations in a state survival
statute have no application to a § 1983 suit brought to redress a denial of rights
that caused the decedent's death").
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eral Narcotics Agents,216 rather than one arising under
§ 1983.217 However, given the similarity between "Bivens ac-
tions" and § 1983 claims,218 courts in the Ninth Circuit (and
elsewhere)219 have looked to Carlson for guidance in address-
ing the survival of claims for pain and suffering in § 1983
cases.220
Carlson arose out of the death of the plaintiffs son while
incarcerated in a federal prison.22' The plaintiff contended
that the failure of prison officials to provide adequate medical
attention caused her son's death,222 thereby violating his
Eighth Amendment rights.22 Under the applicable state law,
216. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
A Bivens action is one in which "federal agents, as individuals, are liable for
damages resulting from their actions when acting under color of federal law."
Shannon v. General Elec. Co., 812 F. Supp. 308, 323 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). Implying
such a cause of action directly from the Constitution was deemed necessary be-
cause a claim under § 1983 "requires action under color of state law," Martinez
v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 441 (10th Cir. 1985), and "federal officials do not act
under color of state law, but rather under color of federal law," Wilkie v. Ari-
zona, 779 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ
& JOHN E. KIRKLIN, § 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES AND FEES 8-9 &
n.42 (1986)).
217. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1237 (7th Cir. 1984) (ob-
serving that Carlson involved "an action brought not against state or local offi-
cials under § 1983 but against federal officials directly under the Constitution");
Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698, 705 n.8
(Ind. Ct. App. 1993) ("Carlson v. Green was a damage action brought directly
against federal prison officials under the Constitution and not as a § 1983 ac-
tion.").
218. See, e.g., Tavarez v. Reno, 54 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting the
"similarity between suits under § 1983 and Bivens"); Grandbouche v. Clancy,
825 F.2d 1463, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987) (observing that "§ 1983 suits and Bivens
actions are conceptually identical"); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 871 (3d
Cir. 1975) (stating that "a Bivens-type cause of action is the federal counterpart
to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983").
219. See, e.g., Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1308-09 (S.D. Ala. 1986);
Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 287 n.3, 295-96 (D. Colo.
1982).
220. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248, 1254-55 (E.D.
Wash. 1987); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981), dis-
approved on other grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th
Cir. 1984); see also LeBoff, supra note 28, at 232 ("Although Carlson dealt with
constitutional deprivations by federal officials, many courts have extended the
rule laid down in Carlson to § 1983 actions where state officials deprived citi-
zens of their federal rights.").
221. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 & n.1 (1980).
222. In particular, the prison officials were alleged to have provided improper
medical care for the decedent's chronic asthmatic condition. See id. at 16 n.1.
223. See id. at 16. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
442 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
however, no recovery was available where the acts com-
plained of caused the victim's death.224
The Court rejected the argument that it should look to
this state law in assessing the survival of the decedent's Bi-
vens claim,225 holding that only a uniform federal survivorship
rule would suffice to redress the constitutional deprivation
being alleged.226  It stated that whenever a state survival
statute would result in the abatement of a Bivens action as-
serted against defendants whose conduct caused the victim's
death, federal common law applies to permit survival of the
action.227 The Court maintained that this result was not in-
consistent with its previous holding in Robertson,"' because
in Robertson the victim's death was not caused by the alleged
constitutional deprivation upon which the action was based.229
Significantly, Justices Powell and Stewart in a concurring
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The amendment has been interpreted to
require prison officials "to provide medical care for those whom [the govern-
ment] is punishing by incarceration." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
(1976); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The
Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials provide a system of ready ac-
cess to adequate medical care.").
224. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17 n.4 (discussing IND. CODE § 34-1-1-1 (1976)).
225. The Court explained:
Bivens defendants are federal officials brought into federal court for
violating the Federal Constitution. No state interests are implicated by
applying purely federal law to them. While it makes some sense to al-
low aspects of § 1983 litigation to vary according to the laws of the
States under whose authority § 1983 defendants work, federal officials
have no similar claim to be bound only by the law of the State in which
they happen to work.
Id. at 24 n.ll.
226. See id. at 23.
227. See id. at 24 (adopting the reasoning of the lower court decision under
review). One federal appellate court described the impact of this holding in the
following terms:
[T]he Supreme Court held that whenever a state survival statute would
abate a Bivens-type suit against a defendant whose conduct caused the
plaintiff's death, federal common law allows the action to survive.
Carlson also contains language indicating that, to further the goal of
deterring the unconstitutional conduct of federal officials, the Court
might apply a federal rule allowing survival of all Bivens actions....
[When a] suit survives under [state] law, [the court] need not decide
whether Carlson would dictate its survival under federal law.
Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1465 n.1 (10th Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted).
228. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1238 (7th Cir. 1984)
(stating that the Carlson Court "distinguished Robertson"); O'Connor v. Several
Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1981) (same).
229. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24.
2000] FOR WHOM BELL TOLLS 443
opinion in Carlson suggested that they would have reached
the same result if the case had arisen under § 1983,230 and
several lower courts have likewise concluded that the analy-
sis in Carlson applies by analogy in § 1983 actions.231
One such court has summarized the present state of the
law as follows: "After Robertson and Carlson,... state law
governs the survivability of section 1983 actions, but a federal
rule of survival supercedes any state law requiring abatement
in an action where the acts of the defendants caused the
death of the injured party."232 Nevertheless, in both Robertson
and Carlson the Court focused on the validity of state sur-
vival statutes that result in the complete abatement of an ac-
tion.2 " Thus, neither case 234 resolves the applicability, in §
1983 actions, of state survival provisions that merely preclude
the recovery of damages for pain and suffering.235 Indeed, the
propriety of extending Carlson to § 1983 actions under any
circumstances remains an open question.2 6
230. Id. at 29-30 (Powell, J., concurring).
231. See, e.g., Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1308-09 (S.D. Ala. 1986);
Bell, 746 F.2d at 1237-38; Kittler v. City of Chicago, No. 84-C1649, 1984 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24714, at **2-3 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1984); see also supra notes 218-
220 and accompanying text.
232. O'Connor, 523 F. Supp. at 1348.
233. See Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So. 2d 207, 209 (La. Ct. App. 1985) ("In Rob-
ertson ... the issue was ... whether the action must be dismissed on the ground
of abatement."), review denied, 472 So. 2d 919 (La. 1985); O'Connor, 523 F.
Supp. at 1348 (observing that Carlson permits survival under federal law
"whenever a state survival statute would abate the action").
234. Carlson did involve state law damage limitations. See also Jones v.
George, 533 F. Supp. 1293, 1304 (S.D. W. Va. 1982).
[I]f the decedent, as was true of the one in Carlson, is not survived by a
spouse or dependent child or relative, damages are limited to funeral,
burial and other expenses incurred directly in connection with the
death, such as the costs of administration of the decedent's estate and
medical costs relative to the injury resulting in death.
Id. However, "application of the state law damage limitations would have pre-
cluded the action entirely," because the plaintiff "could not, as a matter of law,
satisfy the... jurisdictional amount" if they applied. Sager v. City of Woodland
Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 295, 296 n.16 (D. Colo. 1982) (discussing Carlson).
235. See, e.g., Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 82 n.2 (1997) (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the holding in Robertson "does not bear on
the question whether a state limitation on the measure of damages applies to a
§ 1983 claim"); McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir. 1983) (observ-
ing that Robertson "does not require deference to a survival statute that
would... limit the remedies available under § 1983").
236. See, e.g., Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373, 379 (Ala. 1983)
("[W]e are not persuaded that Carlson v. Green mandates the adoption of a fed-
eral rule of survivorship in § 1983 cases ..... ); cf. Jones, 533 F. Supp. at 1303
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2. Where Death is Unrelated to the Constitutional
Deprivation
In Williams v. City of Oakland,237 the federal district
judge who decided Guyton v. Phillips.. extended Guyton's
holding to find a state survival statute inconsistent with
§ 1983 when the victim's death is unrelated to the constitu-
tional violation."9 Like Guyton, Williams involved allegations
of excessive use of force by police officers during an individ-
ual's arrest."' However, the alleged deprivations of the vic-
tim's constitutional rights did not result in her death;241 she
instead died from unrelated causes more than a year after
commencing her § 1983 action.242
After being substituted as plaintiff in his capacity as ad-
ministrator of the decedent's estate, the decedent's husband
sought to recover for the pain and suffering the victim experi-
n.19:
Congress having prescribed § 1988's formula as the course to follow in
§ 1983 actions.. ., the courts are not free to adopt a federal common
law rule of survival which applies to all § 1983 actions as was done, in
effect, in Carlson with respect to all Bivens actions, and are not as free
to apply federal common law in a given § 1983 case as in a given Bivens
case.
Id. The Carlson Court itself suggested that its analysis may not extend to
§ 1983 actions because § 1988, which authorizes resort to state law in such ac-
tions, "does not in terms apply to Bivens actions." Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 24 n.11 (1980); see also LeBoff, supra note 28, at 232 (indicating that the
Carlson Court "looked to federal common law to fashion an appropriate remedy"
because it was "not constrained by § 1988").
237. Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
238. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 1981), disap-
proved on other grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir.
1984).
239. The judge who decided Williams and Guyton, Marilyn Hall Patel, has
frequently been at odds with members of the law enforcement community. See,
e.g., Lisa Wiehl, Keeping Files on the File Keepers: When Prosecutors Are Forced
to Turn Over the Personnel Files of Federal Agents to Defense Lawyers, 72
WASH. L. REV. 73, 91 n.71 (1997) (observing that "Judge Patel is commonly
known as a liberal judge and a critic of the Justice Department," and discussing
one of her rulings, United States v. Lacy, 896 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Cal. 1995), va-
cated by United States v. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1996), that "again"
had that department and other federal agencies "up in arms") (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted).
240. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1075.
241. Like deadly force, see supra note 99, a police officer's use of force that
does not result in death is subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement, and thus, where excessive, can provide the basis for a § 1983
claim. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
242. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1075.
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enced, notwithstanding the California survival provision to
the contrary.143  The plaintiff contended that the holding in
Guyton should apply in all § 1983 actions, and not merely
those in which the victim died as a result of the constitutional
violation.2 "
The defendants argued that where the death of the dece-
dent is unrelated to the constitutional deprivation, the pros-
pect of a pain and suffering award in favor of the decedent's
survivors would not serve as a deterrent.2 4' The defendants
relied on a passage from Robertson v. Wegmann,2 46 noting that
for a state survival statute to have "even a marginal influence
on behavior" in such cases, state officials must have both the
desire and the ability to select victims who would die before
the conclusion of their § 1983 actions for reasons entirely un-
247related to the illegal conduct at issue in those cases.
The court essentially agreed with the plaintiff. 48 It con-
cluded that the holding in Robertson was not based solely on
the fact that the victim's death was unrelated to the civil
rights violation. Rather, Robertson also relied on the fact
that § 1983 claims would abate under the survival statute
only if the decedent leaves no close surviving relatives. 4 9 The
Williams court contrasted that situation with the impact of
the California survival statute, which often leaves the survi-
vors with no remedy25 ° and, correspondingly, defendants with
insufficient incentives to refrain from unlawful conduct.25'
The implication of this analysis is that because relatively
few actions abate under the state survival statute at issue in
Robertson,52 the statute is not inconsistent with § 1983's de-
243. See id.
244. See id. at 1077; cf. LeBoff, supra note 28, at 240 ("Although Guyton...
dealt with [the] situation[] where the unlawful conduct resulted in the death of
the victim, the unavailability of substantial damages equally undermines the
goal of deterrence when the victim died from causes unrelated to the claim.").
245. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1077.
246. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
247. Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1077 (citing Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592 n.10).
248. See id.
249. See id.; see also Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., 87 F.R.D. 26, 28 (N.D. Ga.
1980) ("The situation presented in [Robertson] was an exception to the usual re-
sult under Louisiana law. ... ").
250. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1078. See generally Berry v. City of
Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1506 (10th Cir. 1990) (observing that "some state
[survival] laws may deny all recovery in particular circumstances").
251. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1078.
252. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 591 (observing that "most Louisiana actions sur-
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terrent objective.253 On the other hand, where a survival
statute would completely immunize some defendants from li-
ability under § 1983, those defendants "would know, in ad-
vance, that they would never be monetarily liable under
§ 1983 for acts that cause deprivations of constitutional rights
as long as the victim dies.2 54 For example, a survival statute
precluding the recovery of damages for pain and suffering
may effectively immunize municipalities (which cannot be li-
able for punitive damages)255 from any liability in § 1983 cases
in which the victim dies.256 This leaves those potential defen-
dants with "little or no incentive to refrain from illegal con-
duct,"25 ' and thus is contrary to § 1983's deterrent objective
even in cases where the victim dies of causes unrelated to the
constitutional deprivation.5
As the defendants in Williams contended, however, this
reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the analysis in Robert-
son. 2 1 In Robertson, the Court indicated that § 1983's deter-
rent objective would not be undermined by applying a state
survival statute in cases in which the victim's death was an
"intervening circumstance"26 ' because a defendant is not likely
to be able to select victims who would subsequently die from
causes unrelated to the defendant's unlawful conduct. 62  In
Strickland v. Deaconess Hospital,2 3 for example, the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals cited Robertson for the proposition
vive the plaintiff's death"); Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282,
295 (D. Colo. 1982) (stating that "most actions would survive the plaintiffs
death" in Louisiana).
253. See Kilgo, 87 F.R.D. at 28 ("The Supreme Court [in Robertson] found
that because a civil rights action would almost always survive under Louisiana
law the law was not inconsistent with § 1983 and would control the question of
survival of a § 1983 action.").
254. Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1305-06 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
255. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
256. See Weeks, 649 F. Supp. at 1307.
257. Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
258. See id.
259. See id. at 1077.
260. See generally Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 44 (D. Mass. 1990)
("The analysis in Robertson indicates that the Supreme Court would not usually
consider a state law allowing abatement of a cause of action to be 'inconsistent'
with a federal civil rights statute.").
261. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984) (charac-
terizing Robertson); Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840, 843 (S.D. Fla.
1983) (same).
262. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 n.10 (1978).
263. Strickland v. Deaconess Hospital, 735 P.2d 74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
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that § 1983's deterrent objective is not undermined by the
complete abatement of an action in which the constitutional
deprivation did not cause the victim's death.264 The Strick-
land court, therefore, held that a survival statute that did not
result in abatement of the action,"' but instead merely pre-
cluded recovery for pain and suffering experienced by the de-
cedent,266 cannot be inconsistent with § 1983 in actions
brought to recover for injuries not causing the decedent's
death.267
A similar result was reached in Burns v. City of
Scottsdale,268 where the plaintiffs claimed to have been in-
jured as the result of police officers' use of excessive force
during a traffic stop.269  In addition to various state law
claims,27 ° the plaintiffs asserted a cause of action under
§ 1983.271 After the action commenced, one of the plaintiffs
died of causes unrelated to the incident.2 The remaining
plaintiff, acting in his capacity as personal representative of
the deceased plaintiffs estate,273 filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on the issue of whether damages were re-
264. See id. at 77.
265. See Harvey v. Cleman, 400 P.2d 87, 90 (Wash. 1965) ("In unequivocal
language the [Washington] legislature has established that all causes of action
survive, provided, however, that there can be no recovery by a personal repre-
sentative for pain and suffering. .. personal to and suffered by a deceased.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); Woody's Olympia Lumber, Inc. v. Roney,
513 P.2d 849, 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (observing that under the then appli-
cable Washington survival statute, "all causes of action survive except damages
for pain and suffering") (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
266. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046(1) (1988).
267. See Strickland, 735 P.2d at 76-77.
268. Burns v. City of Scottsdale, No. CIV 96-0578-PHX-RGS, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13961, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 1998).
269. See id.
270. In Arizona, the victim of a police officer's excessive use of force may have
viable state law claims for assault and battery, Bustamonte v. City of Tucson,
701 P.2d 861, 862-63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), negligence, English-Clark v. City of
Tucson, 690 P.2d 1235, 1239 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (citing City of Phoenix v. Pe-
terson, 462 P.2d 829 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969)), and perhaps in some cases, strict
liability, Weekly v. City of Mesa, 888 P.2d 1346, 1352-53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
271. See Burns, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13961, at *1.
272. See id.
273. The applicable state survival statute "prevents abatement of [an] in-
jured person's claim and provides for its enforcement by his personal represen-
tative." Barragan v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 722, 724 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (re-
ferring to ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (West 1995)); see also Lacer v.
Navajo County, 687 P.2d 404, 412 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) ("[O]nly the personal
representative of the deceased may bring an action under ... § 14-3110.").
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coverable under § 1983 for the pain and suffering allegedly
suffered by the decedent prior to his death.274 The pertinent
Arizona survival statute275 prohibits the award of such dam-
ages.
The court indicated that under Robertson v. Wegmann,2..
the issue with which it was confronted was whether the Ari-
zona statute's prohibition of recovery for pain and suffering
was inconsistent with federal law, and in particular with the
policies underlying § 1983.78 Observing that the issue was
one of first impression,279 the court held that the state statute
was not inconsistent with § 1983's deterrent objective.2 °
While acknowledging the importance of that objective, 281 the
court found it "highly unlikely that application of the Arizona
survival statute to a [section] 1983 action where the death of
the plaintiff is due to unrelated and unforeseen events
[would] weaken [section] 1983's role in preventing official il-
legality."282 The court added that this was particularly true in
view of the apparent availability of punitive damages under
274. See Burns, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13961, at *1.
275. The statute states, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every cause of action ... shall survive the death of the person entitled
thereto or liable therefore, and may be asserted by or against the per-
sonal representative of such person, provided that upon the death of
the person injured, damages for pain and suffering of such injured per-
son shall not be allowed.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3110. For an academic discussion of Arizona's sur-
vival statute, see Comment, Lueck Signifies Time for Wrongful Death Reform in
Arizona, 1970 L. & SOC. ORD. 437, 447-49 (1970).
276. See Burns, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13961, at *1; see also Harleysville
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 410 P.2d 495, 498 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966) (observing that "a
cause of action for pain and suffering in favor of the person injured does not
survive the death of the injured person") (italics omitted).
277. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
278. See Burns, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13961, at **2-3.
279. See id. at **1-2.
280. See id. at *5. The Arizona Court of Appeals subsequently reached the
same conclusion. See Badia v. City of Casa Grande, 988 P.2d 134, 140 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that the Arizona survival statute "does not undermine the
deterrent purposes of § 1983").
281. See Burns, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13961, at *5. See generally Berry v.
City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1507 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that "the deter-
rent function [is] central to the purpose of § 1983"); Badia, 988 P.2d at 140 (de-
scribing § 1983's deterrent objective as "fundamental").
282. Burns, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13961, at *5; cf. Badia, 988 P.2d at 140
("[I]t is patently absurd to suggest that officers are likely to engage in unconsti-
tutional conduct based on the assumption that the victim will die within a short
period of time, thereby freeing them from liability for pain and suffering dam-
ages.").
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the Arizona statute,283 because punitive damages serve "both
as an appropriate punishment and a significant deterrent as
contemplated by section 1983.284
Thus, Ninth Circuit courts are not in agreement con-
cerning the propriety of applying a state survival statute pre-
cluding recovery for the decedent's pain and suffering in a
§ 1983 case in which the victim's death was unrelated to the
constitutional deprivation. The court in Williams28 followed
Guyton, for example, in holding that the application of the
state statute in theses cases would be inconsistent with
§ 1983's deterrent objective. The courts in Strickland27 and
Burns,8 on the other hand, concluded that prohibiting recov-
ery for the decedent's pain and suffering is no impediment to
deterrence, in part because it is unlikely that the defendant
could predict the victim's death.
B. The Impact of State Damage Limitations on § 1983's
Compensatory Purpose
1. The View that such Limitations are not Inconsistent
with § 1983
The primary purpose of a § 1983 damage award is to
compensate victims for deprivations of their federal constitu-
tional or statutory rights.288  An award of damages for pain
and suffering experienced by the victim is one aspect of this
compensatory scheme. 20  As one federal court recently ob-
served: "It is hornbook law that pain and suffering, whether
physical or otherwise, is an element of compensatory dam-
283. See Katz v. Filandro, 739 P.2d 822, 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). But cf.
Braun v. Moreno, 466 P.2d 60, 62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that "punitive
damages are not recoverable against the estate of a deceased person").
284. Burns, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13961, at *5. Cf. Bowling v. Oldham, 753
F. Supp. 588, 590 (M.D.N.C. 1990) ("The policy of preventing abuses of power by
state officials is satisfied by the availability of punitive damages.").
285. Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
286. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981), disapproved on
other grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984).
287. Strickland v. Deaconess Hospital, 735 P.2d 74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
288. Burns, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13961, at *1.
289. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978); Davenport v. North
Carolina Dep't of Transp., 776 F. Supp. 1080, 1085 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
290. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307
(1986); Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255, 266-67 (1st Cir.
1987).
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Most state survival statutes also reflect modern tort law's
emphasis upon the compensatory nature of damage awards.292
Pain and suffering damages are nevertheless excluded from
the remedies preserved by many survival statutes293 on the
theory that "an injured person who is dead cannot benefit
from an award for his pain and suffering."29" As one jurist
stated: "The reason for the exclusion is the belief that since
the decedent alone endured the pain and can no longer bene-
fit from the award, there is no reason for the survivors to be
enriched as a result of the decedent's suffering."2 95
Absent a constitutional infirmity, 9 ' it is not the role of
the courts to assess the wisdom or reasonableness of a state's
refusal to compensate for a decedent's pain and suffering.297
Undoubtedly, this conclusion reflects a reasonable legislative
291. In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., 948 F. Supp. 747, 751
(N.D. Ill. 1996); see also Denton v. Superior Court, 945 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Ariz.
1997) ("Compensatory damages include damages for pain and suffering.").
292. See, e.g., Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.
1982) (observing that "survival statutes were designed in accordance with mod-
ern theories of tort law, which stress the compensatory rather than the punitive
aspects of damages for any injury"); Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa.
1975) ("The broadness of the [Pennsylvania survival] statute comprehends the
modern theory of torts which is generally compensatory in nature.").
293. See Burns v. City of Scottsdale, No. CIV 96-0578-PHX-RGS, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13961, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 1998).
294. Vulk v. Haley, 736 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Idaho 1987); see also Weeks v.
Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (S.D. Ala. 1986); Brown v. Morgan County, 518
F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala. 1981) ("It is clear that where the injured party is
deceased, any damage award would not compensate him for his injuries, be-
cause the cruel fact is that he is no longer present to benefit from any damages
awarded.") (emphasis in original).
295. Ingram v. Howard-Needles-Tammen & Bergendoff, 672 P.2d 1083, 1092
(Kan. 1983) (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting) (italics omitted).
296. The interplay between § 1983 and state survival law is of constitutional
magnitude because it implicates federalism issues under the Supremacy Clause.
See Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840, 844 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (discussing
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
297. See Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449, 1455 (8th Cir. 1986); see also
Bills v. United States, 857 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1988).
There appears to be no reason why [a] legislature should not be free to
prescribe the measure of damages recoverable . . . in survival . . .
cases ....
Whatever views we may entertain as to wise public policy on these
matters, it seems clear that they are issues to be resolved by the legis-
lature .... and not by federal courts.
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judgment.298  While the reasonableness of a state survival
statute is not necessarily dispositive of whether the statute is
consistent with § 1983,299 the Supreme Court's analysis in
Robertson v. Wegmann.°° strongly suggests that § 1983's com-
pensatory purpose creates no constitutional impediment to
the application of state survival rules in § 1983 actions3 0
In particular, the Robertson Court stated that § 1983's
compensatory objective "provides no basis for requiring com-
pensation of one who is merely suing as executor of the de-
ceased's estate."3 2 Several courts in the Ninth Circuit have
engaged in similar reasoning in rejecting the contention that
state survival laws precluding recovery for pain and suffering
are inconsistent with § 1983.303
In Evans v. Twin Falls County,"4 for example, the Idaho
Supreme Court held that a state common law rule that per-
sonal causes of action do not survive the death of the injured
party' °5 was not inconsistent with § 1983's compensatory pur-
298. See Bills, 857 F.2d at 1407 ("[W]here the injured party dies before judg-
ment or settlement, the legislature may reasonably conclude that it is unwar-
ranted and incongruous to permit creditors of [the] decedent's estate (or even
next of kin) to... receiv[e] pecuniary benefit based upon the pain and suffering
experienced by someone else."); Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580,
586 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the exclusion of damages for pain and suffering
in California's survival statute "represents the Legislature's reasonable judg-
ment").
299. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 n.8 (1978) (observing that
"the fact that a state survivorship statute may be reasonable [does not] by itself
resolve the question whether it is 'inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States'") (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1996)).
300. Id. at 584.
301. See Steinglass, supra note t, at 624 (observing that "[t]he goal of com-
pensation was disposed of almost summarily" in Robertson).
302. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592. One court in the Ninth Circuit extended
this analysis to conclude that § 1983's deterrent objective is likewise "not un-
dermined by abating [an] action against one who is merely suing as the executor
of the deceased's estate." Strickland v. Deaconess Hosp., 735 P.2d 74, 77 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
303. That conclusion has also been reached by courts in other jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698,
705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); see also Jones v. George, 533 F. Supp. 1293, 1305 (S.D.
W. Va. 1982) (observing that § 1983's "stated policy ... of compensating the vic-
tim of [a] constitutional deprivation[] is not in issue" when the victim is de-
ceased"); Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala. 1981)
(quoting Robertson in concluding that "[t]he policy of compensation is not a fac-
tor in death cases").
304. Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87 (Idaho 1990).
305. See Doe v. Cutter Biological, Inc., No. 95-35238, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
15346, at *17 (9th Cir. June 24, 1996) ("Idaho adheres [sic] to the common law
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pose." 6 The Idaho court specifically noted that a decedent
cannot benefit from an award of pain and suffering dam-
ages. °7 In Strickland v. Deaconess Hospital,"' the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals similarly held that a state survival stat-
ute precluding recovery for pain and suffering0 9 did not
undermine § 1983's compensatory purpose because such
damages are "personal" to the decedent. 10
The California Court of Appeal reached essentially the
same conclusion in Garcia v. Superior Court,1 where it ob-
served that the California survival statute's exclusion of pain
and suffering damages3 2 reflected the state legislature's con-
sidered judgment that "once deceased, the decedent cannot in
any practical way be compensated for his injuries or pain and
suffering, or be made whole."3 13 The availability of punitive
damages under the California survival statute3 1 4 was a sig-
nificant factor underlying the Garcia court's holding that the
statute is not inconsistent with § 1983.310 Although the court
rules of nonsurvivability, except with respect to wrongful death actions and ac-
tions against the estate of the tortfeasor.") (citations omitted).
306. See Evans, 796 P.2d at 93-95.
307. See id. at 91 (citing Vulk v. Haley, 736 P.2d 1309 (Idaho 1987)). Inter-
estingly, the Ninth Circuit discussed Evans with apparent approval in an un-
published decision. See Doe, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 15346, at **15-17.
308. Strickland v. Deaconess Hospital, 735 P.2d 74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
309. See 1961 Wash. Laws ch. 137, sec. 1 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.20.046(1) (West 1988)).
310. See Strickland, 735 P.2d at 76-77.
311. Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1996).
312. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West. 1973 & Supp. 1996).
313. Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586. However, the court also noted that a
decedent's survivors are not precluded by the California survival statute from
recovering for their own losses, including, arguably, damages for pain and suf-
fering. See id.; see also Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, 935 P.2d 781, 789 (Cal.
1997) (noting that the survival statute's prohibition of recovery for pain and suf-
fering "applies to causes of action personal to the decedent and not to causes of
action that others may have for the decedent's wrongful death"). The Garcia
court relied in particular upon the availability of a state law wrongful death ac-
tion whereby the decedent's surviving relatives could recover damages for hav-
ing been deprived of the decedent's comfort and society. See Garcia, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 586. The California Court of Appeal observed that the damages
awarded to compensate for these losses are "akin to those awarded for pain and
suffering and emotional distress." Canavin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 196
Cal. Rptr. 82, 91 (Ct. App. 1983).
314. See Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 980 F. Supp. 1341, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
("California law permits a decedent's heirs or successors to recover ... punitive
or exemplary damages that the decedent would have been entitled to recover
had the decedent lived.").
315. See Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585.
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did not specifically analyze the impact such damages may
have on § 1983's compensatory purpose," 6 there is support for
the conclusion that, in cases where a constitutional depriva-
tion results in the victim's death, punitive damages effec-
tively serve whatever "compensatory" function might have
been served by an award for the decedent's pain and suffer-
ing.3 7
In Brown v. Morgan County, 8 for example, the court in-
dicated that in cases in which a constitutional deprivation re-
sults in death, § 1983's compensatory purpose would be satis-
fied by a punitive damage award.3 9 The court reasoned that
the beneficiaries of compensatory damages would be the same
as the beneficiaries of the punitive damages award-"the next
of kin or other beneficiaries of the deceased's estate."3 2 0  In
other words, because any compensatory damages awarded
under a state survival statute are intended to compensate for
the decedent's losses, and thus represent a potential windfall
for the survivors, 2' the survivors are "in no way disadvan-
taged"322 (i.e., they are not undercompensated) 323 if the only
316. The court instead observed that "[t]he deterrent purpose of [§ 1983] is
satisfied... by the fact that [the state survival statute] expressly allows puni-
tive damages the decedent would have been entitled to recover had he sur-
vived." Id. (emphasis added). This implicit distinction is consistent with Cali-
fornia law, where "[p]unitive damages are not designed to compensate a
plaintiff for actual losses." California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v.
Carter, 210 Cal. Rtpr. 140, 143 (Ct. App. 1985). See generally In re Air Disaster
at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267, 1272 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Lower federal
courts and a majority of state courts have.., held that punitive damages are
penal, rather than compensatory, in nature.").
317. See Air Disaster, 928 F.2d at 1272 ("A minority of state courts view pu-
nitive damages as serving a compensatory purpose."); Perry v. Melton, 299
S.E.2d 8, 12 (W. Va. 1982) ("Some courts have recognized that from the plain-
tiffs standpoint punitive damages are additional compensation for the egre-
gious conduct that has been inflicted on the injured party.") (quoting Hensley v.
Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 (W. Va. 1981)).
318. Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
319. See id. at 664.
320. Id.; see also Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373, 376 (Ala.
1983) (adopting the reasoning in Brown); Boykin, supra note 49, at 43 ("The
Carter court noted that the... punitive damages remedy satisfies the compen-
satory policy of § 1983.").
321. See Kuehn v. Children's Hosp., 119 F.3d 1296, 1303 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[I]f
the victim is dead the award of damages for his pain and suffering constitutes a
windfall-the award is to someone other than the victim."); Bills v. United
States, 857 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1988) (indicating that survivors who are
permitted to recover for a decedent's pain and suffering "derive a windfall").
322. Brown, 518 F. Supp. at 664.
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damages available to them are "punitive" in nature.324
2. The View that State Damage Limitations are
Inconsistent with § 1983
a. Where Death is Unrelated to the Constitutional
Deprivation
In County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,325 the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal declined to extend its holding in Garcia v.
Superior Court326 that the California survival statute is not
inconsistent with § 1983's compensatory objective to cases in
which the victim's death is unrelated to the constitutional
deprivation at issue.327 The plaintiff in County of Los Angeles
brought suit under § 1983 alleging sex discrimination and
sexual harassment in connection with her employment. 28
While the action was pending, the plaintiff died in an unre-
lated automobile accident. The plaintiffs personal represen-
tative thereafter prosecuted the action on her behalf in accor-
dance with the terms of the California survival statute.329
The trial court held that the decedent's claim for emo-
323. See Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (con-
cluding that damages for the decedent's pain and suffering "are not necessary to
compensate his survivors"); cf. Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662,
664 n.3 (Ct. App. 1996) (observing that the decedent "is the only one who should
be compensated" for his pain and suffering) (quoting Lawrence Livingston, Sur-
vival of Tort Actions: A Proposal for California Legislation, 37 CAL. L. REV. 63,
74 (1949)), rev'd on other grounds, 935 P.2d 781 (Cal. 1997).
324. This analysis applies where the compensatory damages at issue are for
the decedent's pain and suffering, because that injury is "strictly personal to the
deceased," and a failure to compensate for it does not "lessen the value of the
estate." Sullivan, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664 n.3 (citations omitted). It may not
apply to damages intended to compensate for economic losses suffered by the
decedent, such as medical expenses incurred prior to death, because such losses
do deplete the decedent's estate. See Brown, 518 F. Supp. at 664. Thus, most
state survival statutes "provide for recovery of ... damages in the nature of
hospital and medical expenses." Gartin v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 749
P.2d 941, 945 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
325. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App.
1996), rev'd, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
326. Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1996).
327. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360.
328. See id. at 359. Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994), is the principal federal statute redressing
sex discrimination in employment, such claims are also cognizable under § 1983
when the employer is a state governmental entity. See Sischo-Nownejad v.
Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991).
329. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359.
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tional distress survived her death33 ° despite the survival stat-
ute's exclusion of damages for pain and suffering."' When the
California Court of Appeal subsequently issued its opinion in
Garcia, the employer sought a writ from the Court of Appeal
directing the trial court to vacate its ruling in County of Los
Angeles."'
The Court of Appeal began its analysis333 by acknowl-
edging that where the alleged constitutional deprivation re-
sults in the victim's death, Garcia holds that the remedies
available to the survivors do not include damages for the de-
cedent's pain and suffering.334 The issue in County of Los An-
geles, however, was whether the same result is appropriate in
cases where the victim's death is unrelated to the constitu-
tional deprivation.33'
The court ultimately concluded that Garcia does not ap-
ply in the latter situation336 because application of the Cali-
fornia survival statute in such cases would be inconsistent
with § 1983's compensatory purpose.337 The court noted that
in Garcia,33 California's wrongful death statutes339 permitted
330. See id.
331. See Ambruster v. Monument 3: Realty Fund VIII Ltd., 963 F. Supp. 862,
864-65 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("Emotional distress damages are within the definition
of pain and suffering damages and do not survive the death of a decedent under
the California survival statute."); Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
662, 664 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The plain language of [the survival statute] precludes
any recovery of emotional distress damages (which are for pain and suffer-
ing) ... ."), rev'd on other grounds, 935 P.2d 781 (Cal. 1997).
332. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359.
333. The procedural history of the County of Los Angeles case is more com-
plex than the abbreviated textual discussion suggests. Relying on Garcia, the
Court of Appeal initially issued an alternative writ, but subsequently concluded
that Garcia was not dispositive and, believing it had therefore acted improvi-
dently, discharged the writ and denied the defendant's petition. See id. at 359-
60. However, the California Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for
further review and, also citing Garcia, directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its
order denying the defendant's petition, issue another writ, and hold argument.
See County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, No. S053930,
1996 Cal. LEXIS 4695, at *1 (Cal. Aug. 21, 1996). The Court of Appeal com-
plied, and ultimately issued the opinion discussed here. See County of Los An-
geles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360. That decision, in turn, was recently overturned
by the California Supreme Court. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,
981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
334. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359.
335. See id. at 359-60.
336. See id. at 360.
337. See id. at 361 (citation omitted).
338. Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Ct. App. 1996).
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the decedent's heirs to recover compensatory damages attrib-
utable to the losses caused by the victim's death.3 4' The court
concluded that it was the potential availability of these state
law damages that justified denying recovery for pain and suf-
fering under § 1983.341 Where the constitutional deprivation
does not result in death, by contrast, the decedent's heirs ob-
viously have no claim for wrongful death.142 Thus, in the lat-
ter situation, application of the state survival statute would
undermine § 1983's compensatory objective by leaving the
heirs "without any meaningful remedy."
343
The California Court of Appeal specifically rejected the
contention that the Supreme Court's decision in Robertson v.
Wegmann344 compelled a different outcome,345 even though the
victim's death in Robertson was also unrelated to the alleged
constitutional deprivation.346 In particular, the County of Los
Angeles court relied upon that portion of Robertson stating
that abatement of a particular claim should not "itself' be suf-
ficient to compel the conclusion that a state survival statute
is inconsistent with § 1983.34 ' The holding in Robertson, the
California court maintained, applied only to situations in
which the pertinent state survival statute is not generally in-
hospitable to the survival of § 1983 actions,3 8 and has no in-
dependent adverse impact on the policies underlying the fed-
eral statute.49  In contrast to the statute at issue in
Robertson, the court went on to hold the California survival
statute is inhospitable to § 1983 claims where the decedent's
339. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 377.60-.61 (West Supp. 1996). For a re-
cent academic discussion of these statutes, see Kimberly Jean Wedding, Cali-
fornia Wrongful Death Statute: Correcting an "Unintended Mistake," 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 453 (1998).
340. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360.
341. See id. at 360-61 (discussing Garcia).
342. See id. at 361.
343. Id.; see also LeBoff, supra note 28, at 241 ("[S]evere limitations on sur-
vival damages defeat the goals of § 1983 when not accompanied by a wrongful
death action.").
344. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
345. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
346. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 594; supra note 111 and accompanying text.
347. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361 (quoting Robertson,
436 U.S. at 594).
348. See id.; cf. Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1304 (S.D. Ala. 1986)
("The [Robertson] Court carefully confined its holding... to the unique facts of
the case.").
349. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
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death is unrelated to the alleged constitutional deprivation
because its application in such a case would leave the dece-
dent's survivors with no meaningful remedy.5
This analysis is questionable.3"1 Contrary to the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal's suggestion, conduct that violates § 1983
but does not result in death clearly can give rise to state law
claims.352 Indeed, the decedent in County of Los Angeles pre-
sumably could have asserted any of several such claims that
would have survived her death,353 despite the inapplicability
of the state wrongful death statute in that case.5 4 Thus, the
Garcia court's conclusion that the availability of state law
remedies may be sufficient to satisfy § 1983's compensatory
350. See id. at 362; cf. O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers,
523 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (E.D. Va. 1981) (concluding that a state survival stat-
ute denying the victim any recovery "effectively calls for the abatement of the
decedent's constitutional claims," and therefore is "inconsistent with the com-
pensatory... policies behind § 1983").
351. The California Supreme Court granted the employer's petition for re-
view of the Court of Appeal's decision, County of Los Angeles v. County of Los
Angeles Superior Court, 932 P.2d 1296 (Cal. 1997), and ultimately reversed the
decision, County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
352. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., con-
curring) (noting that "the same act may constitute both a state tort and the dep-
rivation of a constitutional right"), overruled by Monell v. Department of Social
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); McCummings v. New York City
Transit Auth., 580 N.Y.S.2d 931, 938 (App. Div. 1992) (observing that "tort
claims may clearly arise out of the violation of constitutional rights").
353. The conduct alleged in County of Los Angeles would have been action-
able under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (the "CFEHA"),
see CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12966 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995), and a claim
under that act could have been asserted simultaneously with the plaintiffs
§ 1983 claim. See, e.g., Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist.,
934 F.2d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1991). The plaintiff also could have asserted a
common law wrongful discharge claim premised upon the public policy excep-
tion to the employment-at-will doctrine. See Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 388-
90 (Cal. 1990). But cf. Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 238 (9th
Cir. 1990) (concluding that "the California legislature intended the [CFEHA] to
be the exclusive remedy for a discriminatory wrongful discharge"). However,
the decedent's claim for emotional distress under the CFEHA would not have
survived her death. See California v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Fair.
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 990, 992 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ("Although emotional distress
damages may be recovered under the CFEHA, they do not survive the death of
the injured party.").
354. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361. In fact, the decedent
may well have done so. The court noted that she originally sought relief "on a
variety of theories, including violations of the federal Civil Rights Acts," but
that the only question raised by the petition for review was whether the state
survival statute's prohibition of recovery for a decedent's pain and suffering
"applies to claims brought by the decedent's representative under § 1983." Id.
at 359-60 n.3 (ellipses omitted).
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purpose, 355 which the County of Los Angeles court acknowl-
edged makes "perfect sense" in cases where the constitutional
deprivation caused the victim's death, would appear to be
equally applicable where the victim's death is unrelated to
the constitutional deprivation.356
In Carter v. City of Birmingham,357 for example, the Ala-
bama Supreme Court engaged in essentially the same analy-
sis as the Garcia court, holding that a state statute preclud-
ing the recovery of compensatory damages in wrongful death
cases is not inconsistent with § 1983 because an alternative
state law remedy is available in such cases.38 Although Jus-
tice Richard Jones dissented from that holding, he noted that
the majority's reasoning would apply in all § 1983 cases, and
not merely those in which constitutional deprivation results
in the victim's death."9 Addressing the issue the County of
Los Angeles court overlooked,6 ° Justice Jones explained: "Just
as our wrongful death act affords a state remedy where death
results from conduct proscribed by section 1983, our statutory
and common law affords certain remedies for personal injury
resulting from the same culpable conduct ...""'
Significantly, the California Supreme Court recently re-
versed the California Court of Appeal's ruling in County of
Los Angeles,"2 albeit on slightly different grounds.363 Ac-
knowledging that its analysis was contrary to the result
reached in other cases decided in the Ninth Circuit,364 includ-
ing specifically Williams v. City of Oakland,365 the California
355. See Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Ct. App. 1996).
356. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
357. Carter v. Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373 (Ala. 1983).
358. See id. at 380.
359. See id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
360. See supra notes 351-356 and accompanying text.
361. Carter, 444 So. 2d at 380 (Jones, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
362. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
363. In fact, the California Supreme Court declined to express a view as to
whether the state survival statute's preclusion of damages for the decedent's
pain and suffering would apply in cases such as Garcia, in which the alleged
civil rights violation caused the victim's death. See id. at 78 & n.5.
364. See id. at 77-78 & n.5.
365. Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The
County of Los Angeles court asserted that the federal district court in Williams
overlooked one significant factor that the high court had stressed in Robertson
v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978): whether a state's particular limitation on an
estate's recovery of the deceased plaintiffs damages was an unreasonable one.
See County of Los Angeles, 981 P.2d at 78.
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Supreme Court held that the California survival statute's
prohibition of recovery for a decedent's pain and suffering is
not inconsistent with § 1983's compensatory or deterrent ob-
jectives.366 Among other things, the court concluded that the
statute permits the decedent's estate to recover all damages
to which the decedent would have been entitled except those
for pain and suffering,367 and that the California legislature
had reasonably concluded that pain and suffering injuries are
strictly personal to the decedent, and thus are not transmis-
sible to the estate.368
The California Supreme Court also indicated that its
analysis was not altered by the fact that the statute's applica-
tion may preclude any recovery in cases in which the dece-
dent did not suffer any recoverable pecuniary losses 69-that
366. See County of Los Angeles, 981 P.2d at 75-78. With respect to § 1983's
deterrent objective, the court stated:
To conclude that [the statute's] limitation on damages could have any
influence on the behavior of public officials and employees, we would
have to accept, to paraphrase the high court, the farfetched proposition
that they would have both the desire and ability to select as ... victims
only those who will die before resolution of a civil rights lawsuit and
whose only compensable injury will be emotional distress.
Id. at 76 (quoting Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592 n.10).
367. See id. The court observed that under California's survival law, an es-
tate can recover not only the deceased plaintiffs lost wages, medical expenses,
and any other pecuniary losses incurred before death, but also punitive or ex-
emplary damages. See id. at 75.
368. See id. at 76, 78. The court explained:
Essentially, the line drawn by the Legislature approximates the pecu-
niary out-of-pocket losses the deceased plaintiff experienced because of
the defendant's unlawful behavior. These pecuniary losses, such as lost
or reduced wages or expenses of medical care, actually reduced the
plaintiffs income or increased the plaintiffs pecuniary expenses. If un-
compensated, these pecuniary losses would reduce the value of the es-
tate below what it would have been in the absence of the defendant's
harmful conduct by reducing the plaintiffs lifetime income or by in-
creasing the plaintiffs lifetime expenses. By contrast, when the plain-
tiff experiences emotional distress, the loss is non-pecuniary. Psychic
injury, while it can be psychologically devastating, does not itself re-
duce income or increase expenses. Therefore, psychic injury does not
reduce the value of the plaintiffs estate compared to what it would
have been in the absence of the injury, and the Legislature's decision
not to allow the estate to recover damages for such injury was reason-
able.
Id. at 76 (footnote omitted).
369. See id. This was not the case in County of Los Angeles, however, be-
cause "in addition to damages for emotional distress, the estate [was] seek[ing]
compensation for the deceased plaintiffs back wages as a result of alleged
wrongful termination, a remedy available under California's survival law." Id.
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is, in cases where damages for the decedent's pain and suf-
fering would be the only significant component of compensa-
tion."' Quoting the Supreme Court's observation in Robert-
son v. Wegmann371 that a state survival statute cannot be
considered inconsistent with federal law merely because it
causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation,372 the County of Los
Angeles court concluded that the California statute does not
conflict with federal law even if its application would elimi-
nate all recovery in some cases."
b. Where Death Results From the Constitutional
Deprivation
In holding that the California survival statute is incon-
sistent with § 1983's compensatory purpose, the California
Court of Appeal in County of Los Angeles acknowledged that
the Garcia court's contrary conclusion made "perfect sense"
where the death of the victim was caused by the alleged con-
stitutional deprivation.374 The California Supreme Court, on
the other hand, declined to address that issue. 5 However, a
federal district court in California effectively rejected the
California Court of Appeal's analysis in Williams v. City of
Oakland,"' a case decided two days before Garcia.377
The Williams court interpreted Robertson to have held
that § 1983's compensatory purpose was not undermined by
the state survival statute at issue in that case primarily be-
cause the decedent's § 1983 claim would not have abated if he
had left any surviving next of kin.7 In the Williams court's
at 77.
370. See id. at 76-77.
371. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
372. See id. at 592.
373. See County of Los Angeles, 981 P.2d at 77. The court did note, however,
that the United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed "whether a
state survival law precluding a deceased plaintiffs estate from recovering dam-
ages for the deceased plaintiffs emotional distress would conflict with the com-
pensation and deterrence goals of the federal civil rights statute in a ... case in
which emotional distress was the only compensable injury." Id. at 77 n.4.
374. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 361
(Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
375. See County of Los Angeles, 981 P.2d at 78 n.6.
376. Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
377. See id. at 1075, 1078.
378. See id. at 1078; see also Dispenza v. Eastern Air Lines, 508 F. Supp. 239,
243 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (observing that the Louisiana survival statute
authorizes suit by "a decedent's next of kin"); Sager v. City of Woodland Park,
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opinion, the implications of the California survival statute are
much broader, 79 because its application would often deprive a
victim's survivors of the only element of damages the victim
himself might have been able to recover.8 ° The court there-
fore concluded that when the party bringing suit on the dece-
dent's behalf is within the "familial range" of those affected by
the alleged constitutional deprivation38' (as, presumably,
where the plaintiff is among the decedent's next of kin),38'
§ 1983's compensatory purpose would be undermined by the
application of a state survival statute precluding recovery for
pain and suffering38' because, unlike in Robertson, there
would be surviving family members "who could benefit from
the section 1983 goal of compensating injured persons."84
543 F. Supp. 282, 295 (D. Colo. 1982) (noting that "most actions would survive
the plaintiffs death" under the Louisiana statute).
379. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1078. In one respect this observation is
unquestionably correct: unlike the California statute, the Louisiana survival
statute permits recovery for pain and suffering in cases where there are sur-
viving next of kin. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also Poynor v.
Cure, 443 So. 2d 1151, 1160 (La. Ct. App. 1983), writ denied, 446 So. 2d 1225
(La. 1984).
380. The court based this assessment on the unavailability of punitive dam-
ages against municipal defendants, and the potential qualified immunity of
municipal officials. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1078; cf. Alexander v. Whit-
man, 114 F.3d 1392, 1399 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The major item of damages in a sur-
vival action (aside from funeral and burial expenses) is recovery for the dece-
dent's pain and suffering between the time of injury and the time of death.").
See generally Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, 935 P.2d 781, 792 (Cal. 1997)
("When... the only damages at issue are for pain and suffering, to say that
such damages are not recoverable is the functional equivalent of saying that
[the victim's] cause of action ... did not survive his death ....
381. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1078.
382. As a general proposition, the California courts define "next of kin" to
mean "those upon whom.., the law has conferred the right to inherit the prop-
erty of one who dies intestate." In re Paterson's Estate, 93 P.2d 825, 829 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1939). But cf. In re Roberts' Estate, 194 P.2d 28, 30 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1948) (suggesting that "next of kin' means only blood relatives").
383. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1078. The court therefore held that the
California survival statute governed the plaintiffs § 1983 claim except to the
extent it prevented him from recovering damages for the decedent's pain and
suffering. See id. at 1079-80.
384. Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449, 1453 (8th Cir. 1986); cf. LeBoff,
supra note 28, at 238-39 ("When the immediate family is forced to sit back and
watch their loved one suffer at the hands of state officials, the family should be
entitled to compensation.").
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3. Assessing the Competing Views-The § 1983 Standing
Issue
The federal standing requirement derives from Article III
of the Constitution, which limits the federal judicial power to
"cases" and "controversies."85 Such standing is present when
(1) the plaintiff has suffered an actual injury, (2) there is a
causal connection between the injury and the defendant's
conduct, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a ruling
in the plaintiffs favor.386 The analysis in Williams v. City of
Oakland387 appears to confuse the impact of a state survival
statute precluding recovery for a decedent's pain and suffer-
ing with the application of a state law standing limitation to
preclude the assertion of a § 1983 claim.388 Although a state
survival statute obviously can give rise to standing issues,
that was not the case in Williams.39 °
Section 1983 redresses injuries attributable to the depri-
vation of an individual's federal rights," ' and not those harms
suffered by the community in generalY.3 2 This limitation pre-
385. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
386. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
387. Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1074.
388. Justice Stevens recognized the distinction in his dissent in Jefferson v.
City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 82 n.2 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that
in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), the Court addressed the "appro-
priate party to bring the suit," and not a "state limitation on the measure of
damages"). See also Boykin, supra note 49, at 39 (characterizing "standing to
sue for the violation of the deceased's federal rights and the damages available
in such cases" as "two [separate] issues").
389. See, e.g., Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 369-
71 (9th Cir. 1998); Falcon v. Richmond Police Dep't, No. C 97-2436 CAL(PR),
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17308, at **8-13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 1998); Hutto v.
Davis, 972 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (W.D. Okla. 1997); Sager v. City of Woodland
Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 290-91 (D. Colo. 1982). See generally Jaco v. Bloechle,
739 F.2d 239, 241 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The resolution of the standing issue requires
an examination of the interrelationship between the federal civil rights statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and [state] survival... statutes.").
390. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1076 ("The parties do not dispute that un-
der California [law] this action survives the death of [the decedent] and by rea-
son of its provisions it may be brought by the decedent's survivors.").
391. See Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87, 94 (Idaho 1990) ("The
§ 1983 cause of action, by virtue of the statute's express language, is a personal
cause of action, actionable only by persons whose civil rights have been vio-
lated.").
392. See Manion v. Holzman, 379 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 976 (1967):
[Section] 1983 is designed for the redress, through federal court action,
of a party who is, or a class of persons who are, injured by subjection to
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cludes relatives of alleged victims of constitutional depriva-
tions from bringing suit under § 1983 where those relatives'
own alleged injuries are indistinct from the harm suffered by
the citizenry at large.9
On the other hand, persons who can allege sufficiently
particularized injuries to their own interests may have
standing to sue under § 1983, 39' even though they may not
have been the direct or intended victim of the unlawful con-
duct at issue.3 95 Courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied this
principle to permit some surviving relatives to recover under
§ 1983 for losses attributable to deprivations of their own con-
stitutionally protected interests,3 6 and have held that this re-
sult cannot be abrogated by state law standing require-
ments."7 This appears to be the "survival" question at issue
a deprivation of a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity-not the
enforcement of abstract rights nor for redress for conduct, which al-
though it constitutes a public wrong in transgression of a constitution-
ally protected right, the only impact resulting therefrom is that which
the individual who seeks redress shares in common with all members
of the public, without specific individual injury to himself.
Id.
393. See, e.g., Clay v. Fort Wayne Community Sch., 76 F.3d 873, 878-79 (7th
Cir. 1996); see also Theis, supra note 38, at 690 ("A deprivation leading to death
would not deprive the members of the family of constitutional rights belonging
to themselves.").
394. See Clay, 76 F.3d at 878; cf. Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black
Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (8th Cir. 1972) ("We think "that all that is re-
quired for a plaintiff to have standing to sue [under § 1983] for a constitutional
or a statutory violation is a showing of injury in fact.") (authorities and internal
quotation marks omitted).
395. See Coggins v. Carpenter, 468 F. Supp. 270, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see
generally Steinglass, supra note t, at 645 (observing that "§ 1983 may be read
as permitting the third-party standing of survivors suing because they were in-
jured by conduct that.., violated the decedent's constitutional rights"); Boykin,
supra note 49, at 49 (observing that Professor Steinglass "would give represen-
tatives of the deceased standing to sue under § 1983 for the violation of a federal
right that resulted in death").
396. See Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1417-20 (9th Cir. 1987)
(children have standing); Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 653-55
(9th Cir. 1985) (decedent's parents have standing). But see Ward v. City of San
Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 283-84 (9th Cir. 1991) (siblings do not have standing).
397. See Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 858 F. Supp. 1064, 1069-70 (S.D.
Cal. 1994), affd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 84 F.3d 1162
(9th Cir. 1996); see also Steinglass, supra note t, at 645 ("A textual argument
can be made that § 1983 itself authorizes parties injured by [constitutional dep-
rivations experienced by] another to recover damages suffered from that in-
jury."). But cf. Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D. Colo.
1982) ("Since § 1983, through § 1988, incorporates the state statutes and these
statutes do not grant standing to the decedent's sister, she lacks standing to as-
464 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
in Williams v. City of Oakland,398 although it actually is a
standing rather than a survival issue.399
In other words, concluding that a decedent's relatives
should have standing to recover under § 1983 for their own
pain and suffering 0 does not establish that they should also
be entitled to recover for the decedent's injuries through ap-
plication of a state survival statute. °1 On the contrary, one
court has observed that in most jurisdictions, "there cannot be
an award for pain and suffering to both the decedent and his
survivor."
42
In Rose v. City of Los Angeles, °3 for example, a federal
district court in the Ninth Circuit held that a § 1983 claim
brought by a decedent's mother would fail if she were at-
tempting to maintain an action for a violation of the dece-
dent's rights.0 4 If this analysis is correct,4 0 the Williams
sert those § 1983 claims.").
398. Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996); cf.
O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1347
(E.D. Va. 1981) ("The... two [issues] ... blend into one problem, for the plain-
tiff.., does have standing to sue as the personal representative of the de-
ceased's estate ... under § 1983 ... if the deceased's constitutional claims sur-
vived his death."). See generally Steinglass, supra note t, at 567 ("treating the
survivor of the person whose rights were violated as the 'party injured' under
§ 1983 "transforms § 1983 into a third party standing statute")).
399. See Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 575 n.2 (1974) (superceded
by statute) (observing that survival statutes "do not permit recovery for harms
suffered by the deceased's family as a result of his death").
400. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1078; see also Martin v. United Sec.
Servs., 314 So. 2d 765, 769 (Fla. 1975) (recognizing "a claim for pain and suf-
fering of close relatives" of the decedent); LeBoff, supra note 28, at 238-39 (indi-
cating that the "immediate family" of an individual who has "suffer[ed] at the
hands of state officials ... should be entitled to compensation").
401. See Gates v. Montalbano, 550 F. Supp. 81, 82-83 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (noting
the "distinction between the survival of the claim of a decedent for injuries" and
the separate claim "of the decedent's next of kin"); Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So. 2d
207, 211 (La. Ct. App.) (observing that "the claims of [a] decedent's estate" pres-
ent a "different situation" from "the claim of decedent's siblings for [their own]
loss"), review denied, 472 So. 2d 919 (La. 1985); Steinglass, supra note t, at 654
n.548 ("The issue of whether a party may assert the rights of others is distinct
from whether ... surviving relative[s] had an actionable constitutional interest
[of their own].").
402. Perkins v. Variety Children's Hosp., 413 So. 2d 760, 764 (Fla. Ct. App.
1982) (emphasis added), quashed and remanded, 445 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1983).
403. Rose v. City of Los Angeles, 814 F. Supp. 878 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
404. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that "courts are uniform in
insisting that a § 1983 plaintiff allege a deprivation of her own constitutional
rights." Id. at 881.
405. Another court in the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff had standing to
sue under § 1983 for damages she sustained as a result of her son's wrongful
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court's reliance upon the purported need for a decedent's rela-
tives to "vindicate" the decedent's rights is misplaced.4 ' Fur-
ther, the result in Rose implicitly rejects the Williams court's
conclusion that a state survival statute precluding recovery
for the decedent's own pain and suffering is inconsistent with
§ 1983's compensatory objective.0 7
This conclusion seems to agree with the reasoning in
Robertson, where the Court suggested in a footnote that state
law cannot deprive a decedent's survivors of the right to bring
suit under § 1983 for injuries to their own interests.0 8 There-
fore, the application of a state survival statute in an action to
recover solely for injuries suffered by the decedent does not
implicate § 1983's compensatory objective.4 9 In other words,
because pain and suffering damages are "personal" to the vic-
tim of a constitutional deprivation, 10 and most state survival
statutes merely address the right to recover for a decedent's
injuries,4 11 the fact that the application of a survival statute
death. See Galindo v. Brownell, 255 F. Supp. 930, 931 (S.D. Cal. 1966). How-
ever, that court found it unnecessary to decide whether she had standing to sue
"for damages for [the] alleged deprivation of the decedent's constitutional and
federally protected rights." Id. (emphasis added).
406. See Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074, 1078 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
407. See Steinglass, supra note t, at 631 n.428. ("If federal law independently
gives [relatives] a constitutional interest in their relationship with [the victim],
that relationship should be enforceable in a § 1983 action under federal damage
policies. In such cases, state limitations on the available damages should not
have any special relevance to the damages available under § 1983.").
408. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 n.9 (1978).
409. See Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449, 1455 (8th Cir. 1986) (dis-
cussing Robertson); see also Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v.
Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) ("Obviously, when the in-
jured person is deceased he cannot be compensated. [Section 1983's compensa-
tory] purpose[] is thus incapable of fulfillment."), adopted in part and vacated in
part, 629 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. 1994).
410. See, e.g., Kynaston v. United States, 717 F.2d 506, 510-11 n.10 (10th
Cir. 1983); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87, 94 (Idaho 1990); Strick-
land v. Deaconess Hosp., 735 P.2d 74, 77 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); see also Sulli-
van v. Delta Air Lines, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 664 n.3 (Ct. App. 1996), rev'd on
other grounds, 935 P.2d 781 (Cal. 1997).
411. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, Haw., 783 F. Supp. 1261,
1264 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Ingram v. Howard-Needles-Tammen & Bergendorf, 672
P.2d 1083, 1092 (Kan. 1983) (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting). See generally Kynas-
ton, 717 F.2d at 511:
[A] survival statute merely maintains an action already in existence.
The injured party's claim after his death becomes a part of the estate,
and the damages recoverable are only those the injured person might
have recovered had he lived. Any funds made available through a re-
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precluding the recovery of damages for the decedent's pain
and suffering may leave the decedent's survivors without a
remedy41. does not establish that the statute fails to satisfy
§ 1983's compensatory purpose.413 Indeed, permitting survi-
vors to recover for the decedent's pain and suffering actually
may result in their receiving a windfall,414 because if the dece-
4 15dent survived, these relatives could not recover.
This reasoning provided the basis for the holding in
Weeks v. Benton,416 where the court addressed the issue of
whether a state statute limiting the recovery in wrongful
death actions to punitive damages was inconsistent with
§ 1983.4" In Weeks, the decedent's survivors effectively
brought a § 1983 claim for the decedent's death . 4 " The survi-
vors were not merely executors of the decedent's estate as was
the plaintiff in Robertson. Relying on the footnote in Robert-
son suggesting that a state survival statute could not pre-
clude a victim's survivors from recovering under § 1983 for
covery belong to the estate for the protection of its creditors and to
compensate the estate for losses it has incurred.
Id.
412. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 361
(Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
413. See, e.g., Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala.
1981).
414. See supra note 321 and accompanying text. See generally Parkerson,
782 F.2d at 1455 (observing that a desire to "prevent the victim's heirs from re-
ceiving an undeserved windfall" may be a "sound reason[] for abating certain
kinds of claims upon the death of the party allegedly injured"). However, at
least one court has questioned opposition to survival provisions "based upon the
argument that justice does not require a windfall to the plaintiffs heirs," as-
serting that the proper question instead is "why a fortuitous event such as
death should extinguish a valid action." Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 445
n.9 (Pa. 1975) (quoting PROSSER, supra note 145, § 126, at 901); see also Canino
v. New York News, 475 A.2d 528, 530 (N.J. 1984) (also quoting PROSSER); cf.
Kuehn v. Children's Hosp., 119 F.3d 1296, 1303 (7th Cir. 1997) (characterizing
the windfall argument as "too powerful" because "it implies that all ... suits
should abate with the death of the victim, not just suits seeking damages for
pain and suffering") (emphasis in original).
415. See Parrott v. Caskey, 873 S.W.2d 142, 150 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) ("The
Survival Statute authorizes recovery of all damages which the injured party, if
living, could recover.").
416. Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
417. See id. at 1303-05.
418. In particular, the court noted that the survivors were direct beneficiar-
ies under the applicable state statute, since the damages recoverable under the
statute were not subject to administration and did not become part of the dece-
dent's estate. See id. at 1306 n.9.
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their own injuries,419 the Weeks court permitted the decedent's
survivors to recover for the losses they had suffered as a re-
sult of his death,42 ° including damages for pain and suffer-
421ing.
The court nevertheless declined to award compensatory
damages for the decedent's losses.2 Adopting essentially the
same reasoning as the California Court of Appeal in Garcia v.
Superior Court,2 3 the Weeks court explained that such an
award was not necessary to compensate the survivors,424 and
that the decedent himself obviously could not be compensated
for his pain and suffering once dead.425
The significance of this reasoning is apparent from the
fact that most state survival statutes do not interfere with the
right of survivors to recover for their own pain and suffer-
ing.42'6 For example, the Arizona statute4 27 at issue in Burns v.
419. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 n.9 (1978).
420. See Weeks, 649 F. Supp. at 1306; cf. Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543
F. Supp. 282, 295 (D. Colo. 1982) (holding that Robertson does not support the
application of state law damage limitations where the plaintiffs "are not mere
executors [but] are suing under § 1983 for injury to their own interests").
421. See Weeks, 649 F. Supp. at 1309.
422. See id.; see also Morse, supra note 48, at 26 (observing that the Weeks
court "held that awarding compensatory damages was only required under §
1983 for losses incurred by the decedent's survivors, such as.. . their own pain
and suffering") (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
423. See Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Ct. App. 1996);
see supra notes 311-313 and accompanying text.
424. See Weeks, 649 F. Supp. at 1309; cf Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 662, 664 n.3 (Ct. App. 1996) ("It does not seem reasonable that an es-
tate should be enhanced by the value placed by a jury on the pain and suffering
experienced by a dead man. The deceased bore the pain and suffering and he is
the only one who should be compensated.") (quoting Livingston, supra note 323,
at 73-74), rev'd on other grounds, 935 P.2d 781 (Cal. 1997).
425. See Weeks, 649 F. Supp. at 1309.
426. See, e.g., Sullivan, 935 P.2d at 789 (noting that the California survival
statute's prohibition of recovery for pain and suffering "applies only to causes of
action personal to the decedent and not to causes of action that others may
have"); Martin v. United Sec. Servs., 314 So. 2d 765, 769 (Fla. 1975) (discussing
a Florida statute that "allow[s] each specified survivor to recover for ... his or
her own mental pain and suffering"). In some jurisdictions this distinction may
be clear from the language of the statute itself. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.46(1) (1996) (limiting uncompensable pain and suffering to that which is
"personal to and suffered by [the] deceased"). In others it is implicit in the fact
that, as a general proposition, survival statutes merely address the right (and
limitations on the right) of a decedent's survivors to recover for "the decedent's
own injuries." Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 795 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. App.
1990).
427. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (West 1995).
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City of Scottsdale42 prevents a decedent's survivors from re-
covering for the decedent's pain and suffering.49 This statute
does not prevent survivors from recovering damages for their
own injuries, including pain and suffering.43 ' Implicitly
adopting the distinction recognized in Weeks,432 the court in
Burns applied Robertson in holding that this statutory
scheme is not inconsistent with § 1983's compensatory pur-
pose because it permits survivors to be compensated for their
own injuries.' The Washington Court of Appeals reached a
similar conclusion in Strickland v. Deaconess Hospital,434
where a comparable statutory scheme existed.4 5
This interpretation of Robertson is shared by other
courts, both in the Ninth Circuit3 6 and elsewhere, 37 and ap-
pears correct. Indeed, the dissenting justices in Robertson it-
self appear to have interpreted the Court's decision in this
428. Burns v. City of Scottsdale, No. CIV 96-0578-PHX-RGS, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13961, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 16, 1998).
429. See Eades v. House, 413 P.2d 576, 578 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966); Harleysville
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 410 P.2d 495, 498 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966); Harrington v.
Flanders, 407 P.2d 946, 948 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965).
430. See Watts v. Golden Age Nursing Home, 619 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Ariz.
1980). The Arizona Supreme Court held that because the plaintiff was not su-
ing in a representative capacity to recover for her deceased husband's injuries,
but instead was suing on her own behalf to recover for losses she had incurred
as the result of her husband's injuries, the Arizona survival statute had no ap-
plication. See id.
431. See City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 466 P.2d 383, 386-88 (Ariz. 1970);
City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 458 P.2d 361, 364 n.2, 367-68 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1969), vacated, 466 P.2d 383 (Ariz. 1970).
432. See supra notes 416-421 and accompanying text.
433. See Burns v. City of Scottsdale, No. CIV 96-0578-PHX-RGS, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13961, *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 16, 1998).
434. Strickland v. Deaconess Hospital, 735 P.2d 74, 76-77 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987) (applying state survival statute to preclude recovery under § 1983 for pain
and suffering "personal" to the decedent).
435. See Cavazos v. Franklin, 867 P.2d 674, 678 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (not-
ing that a decedent's survivors "suing in their own right are entitled to recover
damages for pain and suffering," even though the Washington survival statute
"expressly prohibit[ed] recovery for the decedent's pain and suffering"). The
Washington survival statute has since been amended. See supra note 116.
436. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 773 F. Supp.
204, 214 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (citing Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), for
the proposition that a state survival statute is not inconsistent with § 1983
where it is "not the injured party who state law fail[s] to compensate, but a
third party").
437. See, e.g., Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala.
1981). But see Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 1982) (con-
cluding that the "administratrix of [an] estate should also be considered an in-
jured 'person' for the purposes of § 1983").
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fashion. In short, because the decedent's pain and suffering
is not a loss suffered by the decedent's beneficiaries (or the
decedent's estate), excluding damages for that pain and suf-
fering from the recovery available under a state survival
statute is not inconsistent with § 1983's compensatory pur-
pose,439 because that purpose is simply "incapable of fulfill-
ment" where the victim of the constitutional deprivation is
deceased.44 °
IV. CONCLUSION
There is relatively little authority addressing the right of
survivors to recover for a decedent's pain and suffering under
§ 1983, 44' and no controlling Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit
precedent.42 While the Supreme Court's decision in Robert-
son v. Wegmann443 provides some guidance, lower courts in
the Ninth Circuit disagree on how such pain and suffering is-
sues should be resolved.444
The validity of a state statutory limitation on recovery for
pain and suffering may depend upon whether the constitu-
tional deprivation leading to the § 1983 claim resulted in the
victim's death,445 or the death instead was unrelated to thed • . • 441
deprivation. In neither situation does a state survival stat-
ute precluding recovery for a decedent's pain and suffering
438. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 600-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the Court "intimate[d]" that abatement of the action under the applicable
state survival statute was not inconsistent with § 1983's compensatory purpose
because the decedent's survivors "were not personally injured").
439. See, e.g., Rosenblum v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 878 F. Supp. 1404,
1408-09 (D. Colo. 1994).
440. See Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d
698, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
441. See Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981), disap-
proved on other grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir.
1984).
442. See, e.g., Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230, 232 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
443. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 584.
444. Compare Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1996),
with Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. at 230.
445. See Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248, 1256 (E.D. Wash.
1987) (describing the situation in which "the alleged deprivation of constitu-
tional rights caused the death of plaintiffs decedent" as "distinct from Robert-
son"). But see Boykin, supra note 49, at 49 ("Not surprisingly, courts have ap-
plied Robertson to wrongful death actions under § 1983, because the Supreme
Court has yet to decide such a case.").
446. Compare Robertson, 436 U.S. at 594, with Weeks v. Benton, 649 F.
Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
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appear to be inconsistent with § 1983's compensatory pur-
pose,47 because "the victim once deceased cannot practicably
be compensated for the loss." 448 Where the death is unrelated
to the constitutional deprivation, such a statute is also consis-
tent with § 1983's deterrent objective, since its application
most likely has little influence on future behavior.9
Where the constitutional deprivation is the cause of the
victim's death, on the other hand, the application of a state
survival statute precluding recovery for pain and suffering
may be an impediment to deterrence.450 In particular, courts
have suggested that the application of such a statute in those
circumstances may encourage individuals contemplating the
violation of others' rights to engage in conduct severe enough
to kill their victims.4 1 While that assessment is not entirely
persuasive,452 several courts in the Ninth Circuit have held
that a survival statute precluding recovery for pain and suf-
fering is inconsistent with § 1983's deterrent objective in
cases where the constitutional deprivation results in death.4 3
The Ninth Circuit could eliminate much of the existing
confusion concerning the recoverability of pain and suffering
damages in § 1983 actions by addressing that issue directly.
Alternatively, Congress could resolve the issue through the
447. See Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d
698, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (observing that § 1983's compensatory purpose
cannot be fulfilled "when the injured person is deceased").
448. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1236 (7th Cir. 1984); see also
Morse, supra note 48, at 26 n.69.
449. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592 n.10; see also Bell, 746 F.2d at 1239 (ob-
serving that the Robertson Court "did not perceive any significant loss of deter-
rence" in the application of a restrictive state survival statute where the vic-
tim's death was "an intervening circumstance").
450. See McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir. 1983) ("To what-
ever extent [Robertson holds that] § 1988 makes state law applicable to § 1983
actions, it does not require deference to a survival statute that would ... limit
the remedies available under § 1983 for unconstitutional conduct that causes
death."). One lower court asserted that the Robertson Court itself recognized
"the potential anti-deterrent effects of [such] state law limitations in situations
where unconstitutional conduct causes death." Sager v. City of Woodland Park,
543 F. Supp. 282, 295 (D. Colo. 1982).
451. See, e.g., Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal.
1983).
452. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 50 n.17 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Ct. App. 1996).
453. See Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230, 233 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Davis
v. City of Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248, 1254-56 (E.D. Wash. 1987); Guyton v.
Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981), disapproved on other
grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984).
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enactment of federal legislation. In the absence of such fed-
eral appellate or legislative action, however, the lower courts
in the Ninth Circuit are likely to continue to differ in their
applications of state survival law to § 1983 claims.

